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Abstract
The Finnish economy is predicted to post year-on-year growth of 1.1% in 2016. Over the next two years 
growth will hover around 1%, and cumulative growth for the whole outlook period will reach no more than 
some 3%. 
Despite the slight rebound, the outlook for Finland’s immediate future is one of continued economic 
weakness. The 2018 forecast is that GDP will still be some 3% lower than in 2008, and that industrial output 
will be around one-fifth lower than 10 years ago. The performance of exports will remain weaker than global 
trade, and therefore Finland will continue to lose market shares in world trade.
In the next few years ahead private consumption and investment will be the main drivers of economic 
activity. In the medium term potential output growth, which reflects the level of output possible given the 
resources on hand, will be less than 1%.
The growth outlook for the global economy and trade has deteriorated recently. World trade growth will 
reach just 2% this year, one percentage point slower than global trade growth. 
The UK’s exit from the EU is primarily a negative shock for the British economy itself. UK economic 
growth will slow appreciably in the immediate future.
In Finland, public finances will remain in deficit until the end of the decade. Successive governments 
have undertaken substantial fiscal adjustment efforts, but nonetheless failed to significantly reduce the deficit. 
Slow economic growth is not generating enough tax revenue to finance public expenditure.

Preface
This Economic Survey offers projections of economic developments in 2016–2018. In addi-
tion to short-term prospects, it includes a medium-term economic outlook extending to 
2020.
The forecast and trend projections in the survey are prepared independently by the Min-
istry of Finance Economics Department based on the Act on the implementation of the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
and on multi-annual budgetary frameworks (869/2012).
The forecasts are based on national accounts data for 2015 published by Statistics Fin-
land in July 2016 and on other public statistical sources available by 2 September 2016.
Helsinki September 2016
Ministry of Finance Economics Department
Markus Sovala
Director general
Mikko Spolander  
Director
Stability unit
(Public finances)
The source for all data on materialised developments is Statistics Finland unless otherwise indicated. 
SYMBOLS AND CONVENTIONS USED
- nil
0 less than half the final digit shown
.. not available
. not pertinent
** forecast 
CPB CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
HWWI Hamburgisches WeltWirtschafts Institut
IMF International Monetary Fund
MoF Ministry of Finance
Each of the figures presented in the tables has been rounded separately.
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Summary
Economic outlook 2015-2017
Statistics Finland’s most recent figures indicate that after three years of recession, the 
Finnish economy posted GDP growth of 0.2% in 2015. The extremely modest growth was 
mainly driven by domestic demand.
The year-on-year growth forecast for 2016 is 1.1%. Over the next two years growth will 
hover around 1%, and cumulative growth for the whole outlook period will reach no more 
than some 3%.
Despite the slight rebound, the outlook for Finland’s immediate future is one of con-
tinued economic weakness. The 2018 forecast is that GDP will still be some 3% lower than 
in 2008, and that industrial output will be around one-fifth lower than 10 years ago. The 
performance of exports will remain weaker than global trade, and therefore Finland will 
continue to lose market shares in world trade.
In the next few years ahead private consumption and investment will be the main driv-
ers of economic activity. In the medium term potential output growth, which reflects the 
level of output possible given the resources on hand, will be less than 1%. 
The growth outlook for the global economy and trade has deteriorated recently. World 
trade growth will reach just 2% this year, one percentage point slower than global trade 
growth. It is forecast that global trade will pick up slightly, but even by the end of the fore-
cast horizon growth will reach no more than 4%. Growth prospects in China have contin-
ued to deteriorate, and the growth rate will slow to 6% in 2018. The slowdown of economic 
growth in China is reflected in the outlook of other emerging economies, above all because 
of the slower demand for raw materials. Recent developments in the Chinese stock market 
have prompted some uncertainty, but the stock market structure and operation differ sig-
nificantly from those of its western counterparts and does not reflect developments in the 
real economy in the same way. There are no signs of a quick recovery in the Russian econ-
omy. Russian imports are continuing to fall, and there is still no evidence of the restruc-
turing efforts that would be needed to achieve an economic rebound.
It is expected that many of Finland’s major trade partners will see quite robust economic 
development. The Swedish economy will continue to grow at good clip: the growth forecast 
for the current year is over 3% and over the next two years growth will remain clearly faster 
than in the EU on average. The euro area has recovered to moderate economic growth, and 
cumulative growth over the outlook period will reach around 4%. US economic growth 
will slow slightly during 2016 and come in at 1.7%. However in 2017 and 2018 it is predicted 
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that growth will rebound to over 2% again. The UK’s exit from the EU is primarily a nega-
tive shock for the British economy itself. UK economic growth will slow appreciably in the 
immediate future, and therefore Brexit will to some extent affect its trade partners’ eco-
nomic prospects. However it is still too early to offer confident estimates of the real economic 
effects of Brexit because negotiations on the terms of the UK exit will not start until later.
The monetary policies pursued by central banks are growth-supportive. The ECB has 
further expanded its exceptional monetary policy operations, and its reference rates will 
remain at historically low levels throughout the outlook period. Short-term interest rates 
will remain negative throughout the forecast horizon, and the average 10-year interest rate 
in 2018 will be  just 1%.
It is projected that the euro to dollar exchange rate will remain more or less unchanged 
at its current 1.1 level throughout the forecast horizon. Some 80% of Finnish exports are 
invoiced in euros or dollars. Lower energy prices, and oil prices in particular, are good news 
for the growth prospects of energy-intensive economies such as Finland. The sharpest falls 
in energy and raw material prices have bottomed out, and the price of oil will return to 
very moderate growth. There are no signs of any upward pressure developing on the prices 
of raw materials used by industry. 
The development of earnings has a direct bearing on competitiveness and also impacts 
domestic cost trends. Nominal earnings will rise by just over 1% in 2016, but next year the 
Competitiveness Pact will slow the index of wage and salary earnings to less than 1%, and 
employers’ social security contributions will decrease by around 7%. Assuming that these 
projections are accurate, Finnish competitiveness will improve in comparison with Swe-
den and Germany, for instance.
The Finnish GDP growth forecast for 2016 is 1.1%. This moderate growth will mainly 
be driven by private consumption and increasing investment. Private consumption will 
increase by 1.2% from last year, primarily on the back of household real disposable income 
growth and the turn for the better in the labour market. There will be no major change in 
household indebtedness, and the savings rate will fall slightly. Private investment is predicted 
to show broad-based growth at 4.3%, with only R&D investment decreasing. Investment 
in residential housing construction will increase by 9% from last year and other building 
construction investment by just over 7%.
With imports growth outpacing exports growth, net exports will have a clearly negative 
effect on economic growth. Imports will increase by 2% this year on the back of increasing 
investment and consumer demand. It is predicted that exports will rise by no more than 
1.0%, and therefore Finland will continue to lose market shares in world trade. It is pre-
dicted that the current account will show a slight surplus this year.
Industrial output is continuing to fall: the forecast predicts a year-on-year decrease of 
2.2%. Service output growth will come in at less than 1%, so overall the picture of output 
in 2016 is very subdued. The employment rate is predicted to rise to 68.5%. The trend of 
the unemployment rate has begun to fall slightly, and the annual average unemployment 
rate is predicted to come in at 9%. The number of the long-term unemployed is still rising. 
Consumer prices are continuing to rise moderately at just 0.4%.
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The GDP growth forecast for 2017 is 0.9%. This growth will again mainly be driven by 
investment and private consumption. Exports will pick up in the wake of rebounding world 
trade, but the growth rate will remain historically subdued. Exports will marginally outpace 
imports growth, so the growth contribution of net exports will be slightly positive. Private 
investment will continue to develop favourably, even though the period of fastest growth 
in construction investment has passed. On the other hand, investment in machinery and 
equipment and R&D investment will also return to growth.
Private consumption volume growth will slow somewhat to 0.7%, but still remain rel-
atively strong compared with the development of disposable income. It is predicted that 
as a result of the Competitiveness Pact, nominal earnings will rise by no more than 0.8%. 
The improving employment situation will contribute to bolster private consumption. It is 
predicted that industrial output will at long last return to growth of around 2%, mainly on 
the back of strong metal industry performance. There is no significant recovery in sight for 
service production. The number of employed persons will increase by 0.3%, and the unem-
ployment rate is expected to fall to 8.8%. Consumer prices will accelerate to 1.1%.
The GDP growth forecast for the last year of the forecast horizon is 1.1%. Overall, the 
growth outlook for the 2016–2018 period is extremely subdued. The reason for this lies 
in the sluggish performance of exports throughout the outlook period. In the short term 
domestic demand will continue to drive economic growth, but for a small open economy 
like Finland this is not enough to generate faster than projected growth. From the point of 
view of economic welfare and the underlying international division of labour, it is crucial 
that the country also has a competitive export sector.
Projected cumulative growth in 2016–2018 will reach no more than some 3%, and the 
GDP volume will still remain lower than in 2008. The Finnish economy is thus in poor 
shape and faces even greater challenges than foreseen earlier. During the forecast horizon 
the Finnish economy will grow slightly faster than potential output, and therefore the neg-
ative output gap will shrink.
Finnish public finances will remain in deficit over the outlook period, despite the fiscal 
adjustment efforts of successive governments. The deficit is gradually shrinking, though. 
The sluggish rate of economic growth is not generating enough tax revenue to finance pub-
lic expenditure, which is furthermore increasing with population ageing. Within general 
government, the sector showing the biggest deficit is central government. The tax rate, i.e. 
the ratio of taxes to GDP, is set to fall in the next years ahead. The Competitiveness Pact will 
significantly reduce the tax rate. The expenditure rate will also fall over the outlook horizon. 
The public debt to GDP ratio has risen without interruption for a long time, and the 
debt ratio will only begin to fall towards the end of the decade. In 2015 the general govern-
ment debt ratio breached the 60% limit set out in the EU Treaty, and it will remain over the 
limit until the end of the decade.
The risks of the forecast for the international economy remain skewed to the downside. 
In China, indebtedness has continued to grow rapidly, especially in the private sector. The 
Chinese slowdown and restructuring may also cause greater than anticipated problems 
especially for emerging economies. In the euro area, too, the risks remain skewed to the 
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downside, and it is extremely difficult to forecast the economic fallout of Brexit. Russia’s 
economic situation remains precarious. Political tensions are on the rise again and may 
further deepen the recession in Russia.
The sense of uncertainty is also expected to continue in the financial market. The situ-
ation in the Italian and to some extent in the German banking sector is causing concern, 
and there is an apparent risk of contagion. Bank stress testing will not be enough to com-
pletely dissipate the uncertainty surrounding the banking sector. It is impossible to offer an 
overall assessment of the consequences of an unconventional fiscal policy. In any event the 
current environment of light fiscal policy has created a stronger search-for-yield mentality, 
and investment flows have been channelled into the housing and stock market, partly as a 
result of the low demand for credit.
The domestic risks are related to the development of the real economy and the labour 
market. Finnish economic growth has been dismal in the past few years, and it will con-
tinue to remain slower than in competitor countries over the next couple of years. Given 
the kind of growth trajectory projected, the Finnish economy will be sensitive to negative 
shocks, and the growth rate will not be sufficient to bring a significant improvement to the 
labour market. The Government’s employment target will not be reached under the con-
ditions forecast, and the growth of long-term and structural unemployment will scar the 
economy for a long time to come. The projected economic scenario will not significantly 
improve the health of public finances in Finland.
Priority focus should now be given to developing economic policy reforms that have 
genuine impact on household and business behaviour. The proportion of the inactive popu-
lation is too high, and the supply and demand match in the labour market needs improving. 
Decisions on business location and production activities are influenced by input price levels 
and their development. In a competitive marketplace these factors will have an increasingly 
pronounced influence, and this should be taken into account in economic policy making.
Given the subdued economic outlook, the development of the Finnish economy and the 
country’s economic policies will be closely watched, both within and from outside its bor-
ders. The views and assessments of outside observers will also have an impact on how the 
future economic operating environment takes shape. 
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Table 1. Key forecast figures 
2015
EUR 
bn
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
change in volume, %
GDP at market prices 209 -0.8 -0.7 0.2 1.1 0.9 1.1 
Imports 78 0.5 -0.2 1.9 2.0 2.9 3.6 
Total supply 287 -0.4 -0.6 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.8 
Exports 77 1.1 -1.7 -0.2 1.0 3.0 3.8 
Consumption 167 0.0 0.3 1.1 0.8 0.1 0.4 
private 116 -0.5 0.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.6 
public 51 1.1 -0.5 0.4 -0.1 -1.3 0.0 
Investment 43 -4.9 -2.5 0.7 4.3 3.3 2.9 
private 35 -6.6 -3.4 2.2 4.3 3.9 3.8 
public 8 2.6 0.9 -5.1 4.3 0.6 -0.8 
Total demand 288 -0.4 -0.6 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.8 
domestic demand 211 -1.1 -0.1 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.1 
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
GDP, EUR bn 203 205 209 213 218 223
Services, change in volume, % -1.4 -0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
Industry, change in volume, % 0.0 -0.5 -2.5 -2.2 1.9 2.6 
Labour productivity, change, % 0.5 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.3 1.0 
Employed labour force, change, % -1.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 
Employment rate, % 68.5 68.3 68.1 68.5 68.8 69.3 
Unemployment rate, % 8.2 8.7 9.4 9.0 8.8 8.5 
Consumer price index, change, % 1.5 1.0 -0.2 0.4 1.1 1.3 
Index of wage and salary earnings, change, % 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.8 1.2 
Current account, EUR bn -3.3 -1.9 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Current account, relative to GDP, % -1.6 -0.9 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Short-term interest rates (3-month Euribor), % 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 
Long-term interest rates (10-year govt. bonds), % 1.9 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 1.0 
General government expenditure, relative to GDP, % 57.5 58.1 57.7 57.4 56.6 55.9
Tax ratio, relative to GDP, % 43.7 43.9 44.1 44.3 43.3 42.9
General government net lending, relative to GDP, % -2.6 -3.2 -2.8 -2.4 -2.6 -2.0
Central government net lending, relative to GDP, % -3.7 -3.7 -3.0 -2.8 -2.8 -2.3
General government gross debt, relative to GDP, % 55.4 59.3 62.6 64.3 65.8 66.4
Central government debt, relative to GDP, % 44.1 46.3 47.7 49.7 51.2 52.1
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Macroeconomic model calculations of fiscal adjustment using fiscal policy 
rules
The following macroeconomic model calculations of fiscal adjustment using fiscal policy rules 
are based on the Kooma model developed by the MoF Economics Department. The 10-year 
projections are for the period from 2017 onwards. The results are reported in relation to the 
steady state path, which may be represented by the current MoF Economics Department’s 
outlook for the economy.
The baseline scenario assesses the impacts of increased public expenditure when this inc-
rease is financed by public debt. Public consumption is increased by 1% of GDP at the start of 
the 10-year period, which immediately increases GDP. Public consumption displaces private 
consumption to some extent, and therefore an increase in public expenditure has the effect of 
reducing private consumption. An increase in public consumption contributes to increase total 
demand, and therefore producer prices begin to rise. Consequently the price competitiveness 
of exports will be reduced and exports will fall. With the slowdown of private domestic demand 
and exports growth, output growth also begins to fall. There is a temporary improvement in 
employment. Public sector debt increases because the increased level of consumption cannot 
be offset by changes to tax bases, but tax rates should also be increased.
The calculation also provides a comparison of financing the increase in public consump-
tion by increasing taxes on earned income and by increasing taxes on consumption. To this 
end we added to the model fiscal policy rules that aim to reduce fluctuations in debt levels and 
that return debt more rapidly back to its baseline. Both rules react in the same way to chan-
ges in debt and the level of debt and thus change either the tax rate on earned income or the 
consumption tax rate. The change of debt and level of debt impact the tax rate such that the 
weight given to the change of debt is about 63% and the weight of the of debt is about 37%.
When the fiscal policy rules are applied, public debt increases less than in the baseline 
scenario. When the change in debt caused by public consumption is adjusted using fiscal 
policy rules, consumption tax and earned income tax change relatively by almost the same 
amount. The Figures below show how different taxes can produce widely varying reactions in 
many key economic variables. The purpose of the fiscal policy rules is to stabilise public debt, 
but in the short term public debt will actually increase since according to the rules the change 
in taxes is incremental.
Fiscal adjustment via the taxation of consumption reduces private consumption more than 
in the baseline scenario. However GDP change is roughly of the same order as in the baseline 
scenario as both exports and investments decrease to a lesser extent and as producer prices 
rise more moderately. The taxation of consumption has no major effect on the labour market. 
The tax hike reduces the surplus that is extracted from labour and therefore reduces the supply 
of labour, and therefore employment remains slightly lower than in the baseline.
Fiscal adjustment via increased taxes on earned income leads to higher wage increases than 
in the previous calculations. As wages gradually rise, the demand for labour decreases and 
unemployment increases. Rising wages also drive up producer prices, and therefore exports 
and investments decline more sharply than in the previous calculations. The change in the 
consumption reaction compared with the baseline scenario is similar with both rules because 
rising wages offset the reduced level of employment when fiscal adjustment is based on earned 
income taxes. GDP is actually lower than in the baseline scenario.
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Medium-term outlook
Finland’s GDP returned to slight growth last year, after three consecutive years of decline. 
Apart from cyclical factors, the poor performance of the economy is due to restructuring 
in industry and the economy as a whole, which has also undermined longer term growth 
prospects. It is expected that economic growth will hover around 1% in 2016–2018, and 
then be driven by the Competitiveness Pact to a rate of just over 1% in the medium term. 
This, however, is still a historically slow rate of growth.
The medium-term outlook can be examined on the basis of potential output, because 
this is thought to determine the economy’s medium-term growth prospects. In its assess-
ments of potential output the MoF Economics Department uses the production function 
method as developed jointly by the EU Commission and Member States, in which poten-
tial output growth is divided between projections of potential labour input, capital and 
total factor productivity. Potential output is an unobservable variable and its assessment 
is highly challenging, especially during a strong economic cycle and under conditions of 
rapid changes in the production structure.
The growth of labour input will increase potential output growth to some extent in the 
medium term. Labour input will decrease over the next years ahead as the population of 
working age continues to shrink. At the same time, though, labour participation rates are 
expected to increase somewhat, especially in older age groups. Another factor determining 
labour input growth is the structural unemployment rate: this is the level of unemployment 
below which upward wage pressure begins to develop in the labour market. In practice this 
means that unemployment is above its structural level when real unit labour costs are fall-
ing, i.e. when wages are rising more slowly than productivity and inflation taken together. 
Using the EU’s common method, it is estimated that the Competitiveness Pact will con-
tribute to lower Finland’s structural unemployment rate to just over 7%. The medium-term 
forecast is that unemployment will begin to approximate this level as the output gap closes. 
Increasing total factor productivity has been a major driver of economic growth in the 
past decades. In recent years, however, total factor productivity has shown only modest 
growth. This slowdown is attributable to both cyclical and structural factors. Output has 
dropped significantly in high-productivity branches, and at the same time services have 
gained increasing prominence in the economy. In recent years total factor productivity 
trend growth has been marginally negative, and it is expected that in the medium term 
growth will only just be positive, compared with growth rates of over 2% in the early 2000s. 
The economy’s potential output is dependent not only on labour input and total factor 
productivity, but also on the existing capital stock. Several years of low investment have con-
tributed to slow capital stock growth and therefore undermined the economy’s future growth 
potential. However an increased investment rate over the outlook period will increase the 
level of potential output through capital stock growth by just under half a per cent a year. 
Overall it is projected that the economy’s growth potential will rise to just over half a 
per cent a year.
The difference between total actual output and potential output, i.e. the output gap is 
negative, when actual output is lower than potential output. This means there is idle capac-
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ity in the economy and output can grow more rapidly than potential output without cre-
ating price pressures. It is estimated that in 2016 the output gap will stand at around 2% 
of potential output. In 2016–2020, it is predicted that the economy will grow at an average 
annual rate of just over 1%. According to the EU’s common production function method, 
Finland’s potential output growth is slower, on average just over half a per cent a year. When 
GDP growth exceeds its potential, the output gap contracts, and according to the forecast 
the output gap will close in 2020. When the output gap closes, unemployment will approach 
its structural level, the labour participation rate will be at its trend level and total factor 
productivity growth will be equivalent to trend growth once all idle production capacity 
has been put to use.
Finnish public finances have been running a significant deficit since 2009. Although eco-
nomic growth is rebounding and the output gap is contracting, this growth is not enough 
to bridge the deficit in public finances. At the same time, population ageing is continu-
ing to weigh down on public finances. General government revenue is therefore no longer 
enough to sustain all the structures and functions of the public sector that were created on 
the foundations of stronger economic growth. Furthermore, it is expected that in the short 
term the Competitiveness Pact will undermine the budgetary position of general govern-
ment. (For more details, see the box on the pages 21–22).
Potential output growth is too slow to stabilise public finances, as it is expected that eco-
nomic growth and therefore tax revenue growth will remain subdued in the years ahead. 
Despite fiscal adjustment, public finances will remain in structural deficit. The public debt 
to GDP ratio exceeded the 60% limit in 2015, but it is anticipated that the growth of the 
debt to GDP ratio will come to a halt by the end of the decade.
Table 2. Key forecast figures for the medium term
2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** 2019** 2020**
GDP at market prices, change in volume, % -0.7 0.2 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3
Consumer price index, change, % 1.0 -0.2 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8
Unemployment rate, % 8.7 9.4 9.0 8.8 8.5 8.1 7.7
Employment rate, % 68.3 68.1 68.5 68.8 69.3 69.7 70.1
General government net lending, relative to GDP, % -3.2 -2.8 -2.4 -2.6 -2.0 -1.5 -1.2
Central government -3.7 -3.0 -2.8 -2.8 -2.3 -2.0 -1.6
Local government -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Social security funds 1.3 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7
Structural balance, relative to GDP, % -1.6 -1.2 -1.2 -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 -1.2
General government gross debt,  relative to GDP, % 59.3 62.6 64.3 65.8 66.4 66.2 65.6
Central government debt, relative to GDP, % 46.3 47.7 49.7 51.2 52.1 52.4 52.2
Output gap, % of potential output 1 -2.8 -2.6 -2.0 -1.7 -1.3 -0.7 0.0
1 Estimated according the method developed jointly by the EU Commission and Member States
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How is the Competitiveness Pact taken into account in the forecast?
The Competitiveness Pact agreement reached by the labour market organisations was signed 
on 14 June 2016. The aim of the agreement is to improve the price competitiveness of Finnish 
business and industry and so to boost exports and employment.
Under the agreement, total annual working hours are increased by 24 hours, public sector 
holiday bonuses are cut, the employer’s social security contributions are reduced, and part of 
the contribution burden is shifted to employees. Furthermore, existing collective agreements 
for both private sector and government employees are extended by one year without pay rises. 
The agreement will reduce unit labour costs in production by some 4%. Furthermore, the Gov-
ernment will introduce tax cuts to support the agreement.
Impacts on employment
It is estimated that the package of measures under the Competitiveness Pact, including the 
effects of tax reductions, could contribute to increase employment by some 40,000 persons in 
the longer term. However, much uncertainty surrounds the employment effects of the Com-
petitiveness Pact. Much will depend on how labour costs in Finland develop in comparison with 
competitor countries from 2017 onwards, and indeed on global economic developments more 
broadly. The subdued outlook of the global economy and especially the sluggish demand for 
investment goods are deterring the short-term positive effects. It is unlikely, therefore, that all 
the positive effects will take hold as quickly as the labour costs are going to fall.
The current forecast by the MoF Economics Department assumes that the reduction of labour 
costs will not yet bring an increase to employment in 2017. The favourable effects of the agree-
ment on labour demand will begin to show up in 2018: employment growth will accelerate 
and continue in 2019–2020. The forecast predicts an overall increase in employment of 46,000 
persons in 2017–2020. The Competitiveness Pact will also contribute to strengthen the favour-
able employment trends. Employment may, however, improve more strongly than predicted 
by virtue of the Competitiveness Pact.
Impacts on public finances
The Competitiveness Pact includes elements that will both strengthen and weaken public finances. 
If the agreement increases employment to the extent expected and if central and local govern-
ment employers manage to take full advantage of the savings potential created by the extension 
of working hours, then the long-term effect of the agreement on public finances may be neutral.
The Competitiveness Pact and associated tax cuts will weaken the budgetary position of 
general government by over one billion euros in 2017–2019 and by over EUR 800 million from 
2020 onwards, not considering the positive effects of improved employment. An increase in 
the number of employed persons by 40,000 would strengthen the budgetary position of gen-
eral government by some EUR 850 million in the longer term.
The Competitiveness Pact will have the effect of reducing general government revenue in 
the short term. It will reduce the overall social insurance contributions paid by employers and 
employees and ease direct taxation. Furthermore, the agreement will in the short term slow 
the growth of the wage bill and the amount of associated taxes and fees levied. The shift in the 
income distribution in favour of business and industry will increase the amount of taxes paid 
by companies on their profits.
On the other hand the agreement will also have the effect of reducing general government 
operating expenditure as the employer’s ancillary costs tied to wages are reduced, public sec-
tor holiday bonuses are cut and as wages are frozen. In the longer term it will also reduce the 
need for labour in the public sector.
The following Table provides a summary assessment of the effects of the Competitiveness 
Pact on the general government’s budgetary position.
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Net annual effect of Competitiveness Pact measures on public finances, EUR million
Measure 2017 2018 2019 2020 Longer 
term
Extension of annual working hours by 24 hours* 50 100 120 140 140
30% cut to public sector holiday bonuses 150 150 150 0 0
Reduction of employers’ sickness insurance contributions -470 -500 -530 -300 -300
Partial transfer of employment pension contribution and 
unemployment insurance contribution from employers to 
employees 10 20 30 40 40
Effect of internal transfer of employees’ sickness insurance 
contributions via taxation -400 -320 -290 -150 -150
Active tax cuts in 2017 -540 -550 -560 -570 -570
Total effect -1200 -1100 -1080 -840 -840
Effects via increased economic activity*   850
Total effect in the longer term  10
* Impossible to reliably assess exact timing of effects
The extension of annual working hours by 24 hours will have no direct effects on general 
government finances. It will, however, reduce the need for labour and create the potential for 
net savings of some EUR 140 million in general government. The achievement of such savings 
requires that central and local government employers separately decide to take advantage of 
this opportunity. The central and local government forecasts assume that the imputed savings 
from longer working hours will gradually materialise by 2020, bearing in mind that the exten-
sion of working hours will bring no savings in the education sector.
The agreement will reduce the employer’s social insurance contribution by around one per-
centage point in 2017–2019. The negative effect on general government finances will be in the 
order of EUR 500 million a year. From 2020 onwards the reduction in the contribution will be 
around 0.6 percentage points, and the negative effects on general government will be reduced 
to around EUR 300 million. In 2017–2019 part of this will be financed by temporary 30% cuts to 
public sector holiday bonuses.
The partial transfer of employment-related pension contributions and unemployment insur-
ance contributions from employers to employees will ease corporate taxation and increase the 
taxation of wage earners by over EUR 300 million in 2017. By 2020, the effect will rise to EUR 
1.1 billion. However, this will have no essential effect on the general government budgetary 
position.
The internal transfers of employees’ sickness insurance contributions that are made for 
technical reasons will ease the taxation of wage earners on average by over EUR 300 million in 
2017–2019, but the effect will be halved from the beginning of 2020. Furthermore, the Govern-
ment will support the agreement by easing the taxation of wage earners and pensioners by a 
total of over EUR 500 million in 2017.
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Fiscal policy
The Government of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä has set itself the target of halting the 
growth of the public debt to GDP ratio by the end of the government term and putting 
an end to living on debt by 2021. To complement and concretise this debt objective, the 
Government has specified targets for the general government budgetary position that con-
cern, on the one hand, the financial position of central government, local government and 
social security funds during the government term; and on the other hand, the medium-
term structural balance of general government. If these targets are met, budget balance 
should more or less be restored in general government by the end of the government term.
Fiscal policy objectives are interim steps en route to public finance sustainability. Among 
the tools applied to achieve these objectives are immediate savings, promoting efficiency 
in public administration and service production, and steps to improve the conditions for 
economic growth. 
As well as specifying fiscal policy objectives, the Government has set the target of increas-
ing the employment rate to 72% and the number of employed persons by 110,000 during its 
term in office. The measures aimed at increasing employment and reducing unemployment 
will promote growth and strengthen public finances. 
According to the forecast the incipient economic rebound is being driven by domestic 
demand. The outlook for exports does not appear to be strengthening. The Competitive-
ness Pact will certainly bolster exports, but will not alone be enough to get exports back to 
growth. Furthermore, the prospects for economic growth have been undermined by restruc-
turing in industry, the growth of structural unemployment and the changing population 
age structure. It must be recognized that Finnish economic growth will not rebound to the 
level seen in the years and decades before the financial crisis.
As the economic downturn recedes, the general government budgetary position will 
gradually improve. The steps taken by the Government to stabilise public finances will also 
contribute to strengthen the budgetary position. Nonetheless public finances are faced with 
the risk of persistent structural imbalance. The foreseeable economic growth will not be 
enough to finance existing public structures nor to guarantee the long-term provision of 
statutory benefits and public services.
The broader picture of the economy is unchanged. For this reason there are no grounds 
to depart from the scale, content or implementation of the package of measures adopted by 
the Government to strengthen public finances.
The immediate savings measures outlined in the Government Programme are entered 
in the central government spending limits and included in the State Budget. These meas-
ures account for some EUR 4 billion of total targeted savings. The remaining EUR 6 bil-
lion depends upon restructuring measures designed to strengthen public finances and to 
increase employment. 
Preparations for the social and health care reform are proceeding according to plan. 
Together with other measures designed to create efficiencies in public administration, the 
reforms have the potential to strengthen public finances by EUR 4 billion, but only in the 
longer term.
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Moderate wage settlements, the Competitiveness Pacts and the associated cuts in taxa-
tion will bolster employment and economic growth. The Government is also committed to 
support growth through investments and guarantees. Public investment is at a high level 
and public sector guarantees have increased very rapidly in recent years. However, it seems 
that without further measures neither the goals set for the employment rate and the num-
ber of employed persons nor the improvements targeted for the general government budg-
etary position will be reached.
High employment and productivity are crucial to economic growth and the stability of 
public finances. The IMF, OECD and other international agencies underline the importance 
of economic restructuring to generating new economic growth. In its 2017 budget nego-
tiations the Government reached agreement on a new set of measures to support employ-
ment and growth. Even with these reforms in place, there remain obstacles to employment 
and productivity growth that must be removed. This is the only way to effectively improve 
the future outlook and to create some room for movement in public finances in the short 
term as well.
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1 Economic outlook
1.1 Global economy 
Global recovery remains sluggish
World purchasing power adjusted GDP growth will reach just 3.1% in 2016 and accelerate 
only slightly in 2017 and 2018. Growth is at its slowest rate since the financial crisis and 
below the long-term average. Many emerging economies have seen a clear slowdown in the 
pace of growth, and the rebound in industrial countries remains modest because of slow 
wage development and the consequent weak consumer demand and sluggish investment.
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Sluggish growth in demand is reflected in slow world trade growth, low commodity 
prices and lower-than-targeted inflation in most major economies. Private investment is 
widely below the long-term trend in industrial countries, indicating that businesses expect 
demand growth to remain subdued. The weakness of demand is also reflected in falling 
export prices. Unemployment is falling only slowly in many advanced economies.
Productivity growth has been slow for a long time now. However OECD data indicate 
that productivity is increasing at the same rate as before in the most efficient companies, 
but slowed significantly in others. Productivity growth will have increasing significance in 
the future, especially in the ageing European labour market.
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The outlook for the UK economy is overshadowed by the uncertainty caused by the 
Brexit vote. As a result companies are postponing their investments, and households are 
spending less. UK growth will slow considerably in 2016–2018, and the economy may even 
dip into recession. Long-term growth, too, will be slower than predicted earlier, which will 
further reduce investment. 
The euro area has remained on a slow growth track, partly as a result of reduced import 
prices and a weaker euro exchange rate. These tailwinds will gradually dissipate. The sup-
ply of credit and overall financing conditions have improved, and fiscal and monetary poli-
cies are expansionary. These factors are contributing to drive private consumer demand in 
particular, and investment is also slowly rebounding.
The UK’s pending exit from the EU is also causing uncertainty in the euro area, which 
may have slight adverse effects on investment and growth. In Spain, Ireland and elsewhere, 
earlier structural reforms have contributed to a return to relatively brisk growth. Euro area 
growth is still hampered by persistently high unemployment. In Sweden, growth is slowing 
but still robust, and employment remains strong.
Broad-based but relatively slow recovery is continuing in the United States. Growth 
is supported by stronger household balance sheets, favourable labour market trends and 
a lighter fiscal policy. Both nominal and real wages are continuing to rise quite robustly. 
Consumer confidence has returned, but expectations have declined somewhat. Investment 
is set to grow at a moderate rate.
The Russian economy remains dependent on oil and gas exports. The country has failed 
to transform itself or to use the revenue generated from raw materials to diversify its pro-
duction structure and to generate increased value added. Its growth potential is effectively 
hampered by unmade investments and obsolete economic structures, such as public inter-
ference in private sector investment and production decisions. Growth in Russia will remain 
very muted even after the current recession.
In China, growth in industry, construction and foreign trade has already slowed sig-
nificantly, and these trends are set to continue. The Chinese economy is now in transition 
from an export and investment driven model to one led by domestic consumption and ser-
vices. Historically, corresponding changes have resulted in a marked slowdown of growth. 
If the country is successful in its policy, the slowdown will be well controlled. On the other 
hand, China continues to adhere to old structures, which will slow the process of change.
World trade growth extremely modest
Slow world trade growth reflects the slowdown of Chinese manufacturing growth and 
sluggish investment in industrial countries. Imports growth will remain modest, espe-
cially in emerging economies.
In the 1990s and early 2000s the growth rate for goods trade was more than twice as 
high as industrial output growth, but at the moment trade is actually growing more slowly 
than production. Earlier, such slow rates of trade growth have only been seen under con-
ditions of recession. Industrial countries’ import elasticity to GDP dipped even before 
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the financial crisis, but has since partly recovered. In emerging economies, by contrast, it 
seems that there has been a permanent decline in import intensity, which means that trade 
growth will remain modest.
Finland’s market share in world trade has continued to shrink, but this trend is now 
slowing. Global trade will not provide a strong demand impetus for Finnish exports.
Inflation set to remain weak
The price of crude oil has remained relatively low, above all in response to the deteriorat-
ing outlook in emerging economies and persistently high US and OPEC supply. As energy 
is an intermediate input in all products and services, the effects of the oil price shock are 
felt throughout the economy.
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Slower than expected growth of demand and continued high supply have caused other 
industrial raw material prices to fall sharply, too. Raw material prices have apparently now 
reached a bottom. Furthermore, the slide in producer prices due to excess capacity in China 
has continued. Together, these factors have turned world export prices into decline.
Inflation expectations are extremely low and have continued to fall. Inflation targets 
will not be met, even with the unusual monetary policy stance of central banks. However 
there is no real threat of a deflationary cycle in sight.
Interest rates to remain very low
Interest rates have remained low due to the scarcity of investment and search for safe 
investments, which has resulted in reduced risk premiums on long-term interest rates. In 
the United States, interest rates have begun slowly to move back to normal, but they will 
remain low throughout the outlook horizon. In the euro area, too, interest rates will long 
be at a clearly lower level than was seen during the pre-crisis period.
Risks remain to the downside
In China, indebtedness has continued to grow rapidly, especially in the private sector. It is 
unclear how successful China will be in reforming its economic model without this lead-
ing to a significant slowdown in growth. However, its adherence to old structures may 
expose the economy to a sharper than anticipated slowdown.
The outcome of the UK referendum on EU membership has already affected the mar-
kets, but the Brexit process may have greater negative repercussions than anticipated not 
only in the UK itself, but globally. In the euro area, too, the risks remain skewed to the 
downside. Economies may struggle even more than anticipated to recover with the waning 
of the current favourable conditions. The ability of the euro area to resist negative shocks 
will remain weak.
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The economic situation in Russia remains fragile, and adjustment to the period of slow 
growth that lies ahead may cause political and economic difficulties.
Extremely low interest rates in industrial countries and a stronger search-for-yield men-
tality have steered investment flows into the housing and stock market, which may have 
led to overvaluations. In Sweden, for instance, housing prices have risen very sharply. The 
winding down of unconventional monetary policy, the edging up of interest rates and the 
strengthening of the US dollar may cause strong reactions in the financial market. Many 
emerging economies in particular may see increased movements of capital.
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Table 3. Gross domestic product
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
change in volume, % 
World (PPP) 3.2 3.2 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.9 
Euro area -0.5 1.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 2.0 
EU 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.0 
Germany 0.4 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.5 
France 0.7 0.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 
Sweden 1.6 2.0 3.9 3.2 2.7 2.5 
United Kingdom 1.7 3.0 2.3 1.7 1.0 1.5 
United States 1.5 2.4 2.4 1.7 2.2 2.2 
Japan 1.6 -0.1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 
China 7.8 7.3 6.9 6.5 6.2 6.0 
Russia 1.2 0.6 -3.7 -2.0 0.0 1.0 
Sources: Eurostat, statistical authorities, IMF, MoF 
Table 4. Background assumptions
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
World trade growth, % 2.6 3.3 2.4 2.0 3.2 4.0 
EUR/USD 1.33 1.33 1.11 1.11 1.05 1.02 
Industrial raw material price index, EA,  
€ (2015=100) 91.0 90.0 100.0 95.0 95.0 95.0 
Crude oil (Brent), €/barrel 82.0 74.5 47.8 39.6 46.7 50.0 
3-month Euribor, % 0.2 0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 
Government bonds (10-year), % 1.9 1.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 1.0 
Export market share (2000=100) 1 84.5 80.8 79.4 78.6 78.5 78.3 
Import prices, % -1.7 -1.6 -4.0 -2.0 1.3 1.4 
1  Ratio of export growth to world trade growth
Sources: Statistical authorities, CPB, HWWI, Reuters, MoF 
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Brexit
The UK referendum on EU membership saw the Brexit campaign prevail: 51.9% of the electorate 
voted to leave the EU, 48.1% voted to remain. Consequently, at the beginning of 2017, the UK is 
expected to notify the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the EU, as required 
under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. This will mark the beginning of a two-year 
negotiating period for the terms of withdrawal. Upon completion of this negotiation process 
EU treaties and laws will no longer be applied to the UK, unless otherwise agreed in these talks 
or unless the period is unanimously extended by all Member States. 
The most important economic issue in the withdrawal negotiations will concern the terms on 
which post-Brexit UK could have access to the EU single market. The withdrawal talks will be con-
ducted under a negotiating framework unanimously adopted by the European Council. Member 
States cannot go it alone and independently negotiate trade agreements, for instance, with the 
UK. The withdrawal agreement is concluded between the EU and the departing country, and will 
require a qualified majority of the European Council and the consent of the European Parliament.
The UK’s exit from the EU will have a number of economic consequences, some of which are 
already visible in exchange rates, purchasing managers indices and other confidence and uncer-
tainty indicators (Figures 1–4). The sterling exchange rate fell by some 10% immediately after the 
Brexit vote, and it seems this was a permanent change. Already this is adversely affecting the stand-
ard of living in the UK. Long-term interest rates also fell, indicating expectations of reduced future 
economic activity. Longer-term ramifications will arise at least from changes in the EU membership 
fee, customs duties and other obstacles to trade, regulation, international movements of capital 
and immigration, as well as from adjustment costs and the confidence shock.
Most analysts conclude that Brexit will have a negative economic impact. Estimates of the 
long-term GDP effects range from 1.8% to 7.9% of GDP (Ebell and Warren, 2016). The magnitude 
of the effect will depend crucially on how the UK rebuilds its trade relations. There is considerable 
uncertainty about these estimates because it is as yet unclear just how the movement of prod-
ucts, services, people and capital will be restricted and because it is difficult to assess the scale 
of the dynamic effects.
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The effects on other countries would also be predominantly negative, but with the exception 
of Ireland minor (Dhingra et al., 2016b).
UK growth will depend on what political choices are made in the future. Although Brexit will 
mainly affect the UK’s GDP performance, it may also have an impact on growth if the changes lead 
to a slowdown of productivity through the slower diffusion of innovations, technologies and bet-
ter management methods, for instance.
How to study the effects of a future Brexit
There are several different models that can be used to study the possible consequences of 
Brexit. The most important modelling methods are based on the estimation of a structural or 
reduced form of an econometric model. The structural method uses a multi-equation model 
to examine the UK economy, allowing for a detailed analysis of each modelled segment of the 
economy, yet in a macroeconomically consistent framework. This provides a reasonably reli-
able assessment of each individual channel of influence. 
The reduced form method, then, uses a model that explains GDP and employment, for instance, 
by EU membership and numerous other factors. This complements the structural model in that it 
implicitly takes into account (almost) all effects of EU membership. The weakness of this approach 
is that the models shed no light on different channels of influence and are unable to analyse the 
magnitude of the effects caused by different factors. Many of the effects of leaving the EU may 
enhance or cancel out each other, or create so-called dynamic effects. In this case a structural 
model might over- or underestimate the total effect, and a reduced model might provide a more 
accurate measurement.
The third possible approach provides separate estimates of the effects of each individual factor 
associated with EU membership in partial balance. This approach does not guarantee the consist-
ency of the macroeconomic estimate, as the analyses by definition exclude the interactions and 
other dependencies between sector or factors.
An integral part of the impact assessment process is counterfactual analysis. This involves 
describing the hypothetical state of the world in which the UK is not a member of the EU. The 
analyses compare actual situations and counterfactual scenarios, and the difference indicates 
the net effect of EU membership. The challenge in these analyses is of course to create a credible 
description of the UK’s new position in the world.
Campos et al. (2014) apply the synthetic counterfactual method to examine the overall effect 
of EU membership in a reduced form model. This method estimates the effect of EU membership 
by comparing the development of a country’s per capita GDP with the corresponding figure for 
a synthetically created country. This country is created so that the weighted average for all the 
countries in the comparative group follows as closely as possible the trajectory of the country con-
cerned before EU membership. The study cited above reported that the long-term effect of EU 
integration has averaged 12% of GDP per capita. The counterfactual scenario can often be con-
structed in a more straightforward manner.
Static effects
One clear effect comes from the UK’s EU membership fee: the country’s net contribution to the 
EU budget is around GDP 8.5 billion a year. Post-Brexit, the membership fee would be lower or 
even zero, bringing the country annual savings of around 0.45% of GDP. If UK-EU relations fol-
low the Norwegian model, the savings would be smaller.  
Customs duties and tariffs, which do not exist in the EU internal market, represent another 
clear effect. The UK uses the customs duties negotiated by the EU in its trade with third countries. 
Post-Brexit UK will have to renegotiate its trade relations. The terms of trade will not necessarily 
be as favourable as they have been for the UK as an EU member. Nor will these negotiations hap-
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pen very quickly. Even if the UK managed eventually to negotiate the same or even better terms 
of trade with third countries, the transitional period of weaker terms will inevitably be a long one.
The third type of clear effects come from so-called other barriers to trade, a residual category 
of other factors that hamper trade or add to the costs of trade. Additional costs arise, for instance, 
from customs clearances and anti-dumping regulations and generally from differences in regula-
tions and national standards. Perhaps the most important role of the internal market is to remove 
these other barriers to trade and to create a bigger ‘domestic market’. Therefore this is an area that 
will cause additional costs from a UK exit.
For the counterfactual scenario, it is necessary to make assumptions about the outcome of 
post-Brexit negotiations on trade arrangements, which will in part determine how big the sce-
nario differences are. Dhinga et al. (2016a) found that customs duties in any case have only a minor 
impact, but other barriers to trade will reduce GDP by 1.3% if the counterfactual is membership 
of the European Economic Area (EEA). If the UK decides to revert to WTO rules, the impact will 
be 2.6%. Ottaviano et al. (2014) estimate that in an optimistic scenario, reduced trade will shrink 
UK GDP by 1.13% and in a pessimistic scenario by 3.09%. The corresponding estimates by Open 
Europe (2015a) are 0.1% and 2.2%. These costs exceed the benefits from lower membership fees.
Dynamic effects
International trade also has indirect dynamic effects. Lower imports mean that the range of 
products and services available in the country will be reduced, there will be less opportunities 
for specialisation, economies of scale will be smaller and the pressures of competition weaker, 
and ineffective businesses will be better placed to remain in the marketplace. A divergence 
of EU and UK economies would also lead to growing differences in regulatory frameworks, 
which over time would increase other barriers to trade. In the future the UK would also be less 
closely involved in deepening the European internal market. Sampson (2016) estimates that 
the dynamic effects will triple the above-mentioned static costs of reduced trade. According 
to Dhinga et al. (2016a), Britain’s departure from the EU and EFTA membership would reduce 
GDP by a total of 6.3–9.5%.
An important but less evident aspect of the counterfactual is the volume of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). FDI improves productivity and growth, primarily because FDI investors are more 
efficient than average companies and bring along new technologies, new innovations and better 
management (Bloom et al., 2012). Haskel et al. (2007) found that the effects of FDI also spill over into 
domestically owned companies. The UK is the EU’s largest FDI recipient, and part of this investment 
is apparently attributable to the country’s EU membership. Part of post-Brexit FDI will be redirected 
elsewhere, and this will have at least a temporary negative effect on productivity and growth.
Pain and Young (2004) estimate that EU membership has increased FDI by 10%, and that its 
impact on productivity is greater than that of domestic investment. Open Europe (2015a) thinks 
the impact is much smaller. This is partly because their analysis does not consider access to the 
EU internal market as an FDI attractant. Bruno et al. (2016) estimate that on average, the impact of 
the UK’s EU membership on direct investment is 22%.
Other channels of influence
Open Europe (2015b) estimates that the total cost to British companies of the 100 most expen-
sive EU regulations comes to more than EUR 33 billion a year. In principle, the UK can ease the 
burden of regulation once it has left the EU. On the other hand, many indicators suggest that 
the UK already has one of the lightest regulatory burdens in the EU. Easing regulation is a politi-
cal decision, and it is not clear that Brexit will be conducive to a political atmosphere where the 
regulation of business will be eased. Furthermore, access to the EU may in any case require that 
products and services comply with EU rules.
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The impacts of the regulatory burden are fairly well understood at the microlevel, but the mac-
roeconomic effects of regulation is a rather more complex issue. A macroeconomic estimate can-
not be put together simply by summing up the effects of individual regulations, for this will only 
provide an estimate of the gross costs of regulation to business.
Post-Brexit UK can also impose tighter controls on immigration from EU countries. However, 
immigrants arriving from the EU are more likely to be employed taxpayers and to be better edu-
cated than the original British population, so it is clear that EU immigration is beneficial for the 
country. Most studies agree that net immigration is beneficial, especially as far as the arrival of 
highly educated immigrants is concerned (e.g. Ottaviano et al., 2016; Ortega and Peri, 2014). Fel-
bermayr (2010) found that a 10% increase in the number of immigrants increased per capita GDP 
by 2.2%. Boubtane et al. (2015) estimate that a 50% reduction in net immigration would reduce 
UK productivity growth by 0.32%.
Access to the EU internal market creates a bigger ’domestic market’, which offers greater econo-
mies of scale and scope, improves opportunities for specialisation and brings increased competi-
tive pressure. These benefits will be lost if post-Brexit access to the internal market is hampered. 
The benefits are mainly generated through dynamic effects. Analysing and measuring them is a 
complex task, and therefore it is also difficult to provide a quantitative estimate. A recent example 
of such an analysis is provided by Ilzkovitz et al. (2007). 
Significant effects may also be created through global value chains. UK companies are an integral 
part of European chains of supply. UK trade with the EU is more heavily tilted towards intermediates 
and cross-border value chains than its trade with the rest of the world. According to the OECD, 8% of 
UK value added in exports came from its EU trade, compared with 3% from trade with the USA, for 
instance (OECD, 2015). Value chains can, however, have major effects. Even if Brexit had only relatively 
minor effects on UK trade or the country’s ability to generate value added, large amounts of pro-
duction related to the global value chain may still be relocated to regions that now provide greater 
relative efficiencies. Traditional trade models may therefore underestimate the effects of Brexit.
Short-term effects
The factors mentioned above will have restructuring effects in the UK and cause transitional 
and disruption costs. Minford (2006) – virtually the only commentator who believes that Brexit 
would be economically beneficial to the UK – comes to the conclusion that manufacturing will 
effectively end in the UK. The transfer of capital, skills, labour and other assets from branches 
and operations most adversely affected by Brexit to branches where Brexit will have less or 
even favourable effects, will not be an easy and smooth process.
Brexit also involves major uncertainties. For instance, the terms of the Brexit agreement are 
still unknown, nor is it clear how it will affect business investment and household consumption 
decisions. In any case the uncertainty and reduced confidence will increase households’ precau-
tionary and savings motives and raise the threshold for investment. This will cause a dip in both 
consumption and investment, with a clear negative short-term effect. The weaker long-term out-
look will also have the effect of deterring investment even in the short term.
Summary
Most analysts come to the conclusion that in the long term, Brexit will make the UK poorer than 
it would be as an EU member. There are significant uncertainties about the magnitude of the 
effects, but the direction is clear.
The effects of Brexit are mainly at the level of GDP. UK growth is dependent first and foremost 
on national characteristics and on political choices. But Brexit can affect growth as well if the 
changes result in a slowdown of productivity through a slower diffusion of innovations, technolo-
gies and better management methods, for instance.
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Since the Brexit result, forecasting agencies have significantly lowered their short-term growth 
projections for the UK. The Ministry of Finance forecast for UK growth over the outlook period has 
been revised downwards by 2.5 percentage points from the June forecast.
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1.2 Foreign trade
 Exports growth slow to start up
According to Statistics Finland’s national accounts figures out in July 2016, exports fell 
by 0.2% in 2015. Exports of goods and services continued to decline in the first quarter of 
2016, but the ship delivery completed in Q2 boosted up the exports growth figures. Slow 
exports growth reflects several factors, the most significant of which have to do with the 
structure of the export industry, Finland’s poor cost competitiveness, and sluggish export 
demand. In 2016 it is projected that exports will return to moderate growth. This will be 
on the back of moderate economic growth in Finland’s most important export markets as 
well as improving price competitiveness. 
Exports are predicted to grow by 1.0% in 2016, which remains slower than the rate of 
growth in the export markets. This year’s exports growth will be bolstered not only by the 
completion of a ship delivery, but also by exports of refined oil products recovering to their 
normal level after an exceptionally poor performance in 2015. Continued low oil prices will 
serve to maintain world demand.
Measured by the real trade-weighted exchange rate, Finland’s competitiveness improved 
during 2015 and has remained at that level in early 2016. When measured by unit labour 
costs, Finland’s competitiveness improved slightly last year over the euro area average. Over 
the outlook period Finnish unit labour cost competitiveness will continue to improve as 
the Competitiveness Pact drives down wage costs and bolsters labour productivity growth.
In 2017 exports growth will reach 3% and in 2018 pick up further to almost 4% on the 
back of growth in advanced economies. Finland will continue to see its export market shares 
decline over the forecast horizon. Improving cost competitiveness will drive exports growth 
towards the end of the outlook period. Economic growth in the euro area will be moder-
ate, but the period of fastest growth has passed. However the slight rebound in investment 
will improve the prospects of Finnish export companies to hold on to their market shares.
Table 5. Foreign trade
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
change in volume, %
Exports of goods and services 1.1 -1.7 -0.2 1.0 3.0 3.8
Imports of goods and services 0.5 -0.2 1.9 2.0 2.9 3.6
change in price, %
Exports of goods and services -1.1 -0.3 -0.9 -2.0 1.3 1.4
Imports of goods and services -1.7 -1.6 -4.0 -2.0 1.3 1.4
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It is as yet unclear how Finnish exports will be affected by the UK’s vote to leave the EU. 
The bulk of Finnish exports to the UK consists of forest industry products. Finland also has 
some machinery and equipment exports to the UK, which will be more immediately affected 
by postponed investments in a climate of declining confidence. The forecast assumes that 
the Brexit vote will have only a marginal impact on Finnish exports, and therefore there is 
a significant risk of weaker than anticipated export growth as the loss of confidence may 
well spread across the rest of Europe.
According to the July national accounts, the volume of imports increased by 1.9% in 
2015. Imports have been subdued in the early part of the year. Q1 imports fell by more than 
4% quarter-on-quarter. In 2016, however, domestic demand will drive imports to growth 
of 2%. Accelerating export growth will increase the use of imported inputs in 2017 and 
2018, which will drive imports growth to over 3% in 2018. The contribution of net exports 
to GDP growth will remain negative in 2016, but turn positive as exports growth gathers 
momentum during the outlook period.
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Table 6. Current account
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR bn
Balance of goods and services -1.8 -1.9 -1.0 -1.8 -1.8 -1.7
Factor incomes and income transfers, net -1.5 0.0 1.3 2.4 2.5 2.5
Current account -3.3 -1.9 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7
Current account, relative to GDP, % -1.6 -0.9 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3
 
Current account to remain in balance
Finland’s 2015 current account surplus stood at EUR 0.3 billion. The deficit decreased rap-
idly in the first half of 2015, and by year-end the current account was marginally in sur-
plus. In 2016 the trade balance surplus will shrink sharply, but the balance will improve 
towards the end of the outlook period with rebounding exports. Factor incomes will con-
tribute to improve the current account this year. In the first half of 2016 receipts of pri-
mary income from abroad have been unchanged from last year, but primary income pay-
ments to other countries have fallen substantially, indicating lower payments of corporate 
profits or possible changes in timing. Nevertheless it is predicted that the current account 
surplus will increase to EUR 0.7 billion in 2018, or 0.3% of GDP. 
The terms of trade have improved mainly as a result of the sharp fall in oil prices, but 
this effect has now faded. Export and import prices have continued to fall early in the year, 
reflecting the sluggish progress in world trade. In 2017 and 2018 it is predicted that foreign 
trade prices will begin to edge up. However import prices will rise only slowly as muted 
world trade growth means that the development of export prices from rival countries will 
remain moderate and as oil prices will only increase very moderately over the outlook period.
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1.3 Domestic demand
1.3.1 Private consumption
Private consumption growth set to slow
Household real disposable income is set to increase by just over one per cent this year. 
As in 2015, purchasing power is bolstered by lower-than-usual inflation, which is due to 
falling oil prices. Consumer prices will rise by just 0.4 % in 2016. Private consumption 
growth is also supported by a slight improvement in employment and falling unemploy-
ment. According to the latest Consumer Survey, the public perception is that the risk of 
unemployment has decreased in the first half of the year.  
In recent months, however, confidence in one’s own financial situation has shown some 
signs of deterioration. Even so the Consumer Survey indicates that consumers still feel this 
is a better-than-average time to make purchases of durables. Indeed, private consumption 
growth has been strongest precisely for durables. It is estimated that demand for durables 
will increase by almost 4 % this year. This is explained by rebounding car sales, which 
began to pick up in late 2015. The average age of cars on the road in Finland has been rising 
in recent years as the number of new car registrations has remained well below the long-
term average.  Lowered car taxes from the beginning of 2016 has also contributed to bol-
ster demand for cars. In January-July the number of new car registrations was up substan-
tially by 14.5 %. It is projected that during the remainder of the year the number of new car 
purchases will be lower than in 2015, partly because it is known that car taxes will again 
be cut from the beginning of 2017. Private consumption growth will slow towards the end 
of 2016 and come in at 1.2 %
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In 2017 private consumption growth will slow to 0.7 %. One contributing factor is that 
household real income will increase by no more than around 0.5 %. Accelerating inflation, 
cuts to social transfers and moderate wage increases will slow the growth of disposable 
household income. The wage bill is projected to grow by no more than 0.8 % next year, despite 
improving employment. Despite the freezing of the national pension index in 2016 – 2018, 
the current transfers received by households will increase nominally by an annual average 
of 2.3 % over the outlook period. One contributing factor is the ongoing process of demo-
graphic change, including the increasing number of pensioners. Under the Competitive-
ness Pact, part of the employer’s burden from social security contributions will be shifted 
to employees. This will be offset by easing taxes on earned incomes in 2017. As a result of 
these tax cuts the average wage earner tax rate will fall slightly in 2017, but rise again in 
2018. Private consumption growth will remain subdued in 2018. Despite a slight acceleration 
in employment growth, household purchasing power will hardly improve at all because of 
rising inflation and a higher tax rate. Private consumption growth will reach 0.6 % in 2018.
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Household debt growth to continue apace 
In recent years private consumption has increased more rapidly than disposable income, 
and consequently the household savings rate has fallen almost without interruption since 
2010. In part, this also reflects the growth of household indebtedness. Low interest rates 
and ready access to loans have increased borrowing. The growth of the debt ratio has not 
even been halted by rising unemployment. The 6–12 month loan repayment holidays mar-
keted last year by banks to housing loan holders have further fuelled the growth of indebt-
edness. Based on the evidence from the first part of the year it seems that households are 
showing a continued interest in these repayment holidays. The debt burden of households 
is further increased by the growing stock of residential housing company loans. The need 
for renovations has increased in the ageing housing stock, and these renovations are being 
financed by housing company loans. Around 45 % of the current housing stock dates from 
the 1960s and 1970s, so the need for renovation will continue to increase indebtedness in 
the years ahead.
In a bid to curb the growth of indebtedness, new legislation was put in place in July 
2016 to cap all new housing loans at 90 % LTV. For first-time buyers, the maximum LTV 
is 95 %. In addition, the tax credit on housing loan interest has been progressively reduced 
in recent years. In the current environment of low interest rates this has had only limited 
effect, however.
There are both upside and downside risks to the forecast for private consumption. Pri-
vate consumption may develop more favourably than forecast if household debt continues 
to grow in the same way as in recent years. In macroeconomic terms the current level of 
household debt is not yet a problem, but the trend certainly gives cause for concern and if 
persistent, it would jeopardise macrostability. The Finnish ratio of household debt to dis-
posable income is slightly higher than in the EU on average. Coupled with the tendency to 
take loan repayment holidays, the persistently low interest rates may well leave households 
with a false impression of the risks involved in an increasing debt burden. Low interest 
rates and ready access to loans, together with strong household sentiment, may therefore 
increase household indebtedness more than expected. This would be reflected not only in 
the housing market, but also in private consumption.
The downside risks associated with private consumption may materialise if employ-
ment trends are weaker than expected. The effects on consumption would be reflected both 
through income formation and consumer expectations, which might lead to a higher sav-
ings rate in the wake of increasing consumer caution.
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1.3.2 Public consumption
Consisting of central government, local government and social security funds consumption 
expenditure, public consumption accounts for just short of one-quarter of GDP. Over the 
past 10 years the volume of public consumption has increased on average by 0.7% a year. The 
price of public consumption has risen on average by 3% a year, around one percentage point 
more than the price of private consumption. The volume of public consumption has been 
more or less unchanged for the past couple of years, and it is thought that over the forecast 
horizon it may even shrink somewhat as a result of fiscal adjustment.
The financing of asylum seeker reception centres will increase central government spend-
ing this year, even though the number of applicants is down from last year. Cuts to operating 
expenditure announced by the previous and current government will contribute to reduce 
consumption. Reduced social security contributions and cuts to holiday bonuses as set out 
under the Competitiveness Pact will reduce labour costs and therefore central government 
spending from the beginning of next year. Furthermore it is assumed that longer working 
hours will reduce central government spending on employee compensations.
Local government consumption expenditure will increase at an exceptionally slow rate in 
the years ahead; in fact in 2017 it is expected that expenditure will decrease. Consumption 
expenditure growth will be slowed among other things by the Competitiveness Pact agree-
ment to reduce employer contributions and to cut holiday bonuses in 2017–2019 as well as 
by moderate wage settlements, structural adjustment measures adopted in the Government 
Programme, and adjustment programmes planned by municipalities and joint municipal 
authorities for the current year. The pension reform that takes effect from the beginning 
of 2017 will also reduce municipal employers’ pension payments. However consumption 
expenditure will pick up again by the end of the decade with the expiry of the temporary 
cuts to holiday bonuses. In addition the changing population age structure and increased 
levels of immigration will increase need for local government services.
Expenditure by social security funds consists mainly of social benefits in kind paid out 
by the Social Insurance Institution Kela (reimbursements for medicines and travel and 
rehabilitation allowances) as well as wages. Savings measures announced by the Govern-
ment will reduce expenditure on social benefits in kind in 2016–2017.
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Table 7. Consumption
2015
share, 
%
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
Change in volume, %
Private consumption 100.0 -0.5 0.6 1.5 1.2 0.7 0.6
Households 95.2 -0.6 0.4 1.5 1.3 0.7 0.6
Durables 8.0 -0.8 1.7 3.2 3.8 1.7 1.3
Semi-durables 8.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.6
Non-durable goods 26.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 1.1 0.2 0.0
Services 52.0 -0.8 0.2 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.8
Consumption by non-profit institutions 4.8 -1.6 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
Public consumption 100.0 1.1 -0.5 0.4 -0.1 -1.3 0.0
Central government 26.8 4.3 -1.5 -0.9 1.4 -1.4 -1.0 
Local government 66.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.1 -1.0 0.3
Social security funds 7.2 0.0 -1.0 3.8 -4.7 -3.4 0.8 
TOTAL 0.0 0.3 1.1 0.8 0.1 0.4
Individual consumption expenditure in  
general government 0.1 -0.5 0.8 -0.6 -1.5 0.3
Total individual consumption expenditure -0.4 0.3 1.3 -0.4 0.2 0.6
Households´ disposable income 2.8 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.7
Private consumption deflator 2.5 1.5 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.3
Households´ real disposable income 0.3 -0.9 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.4
%
Consumption as proportion of GDP 
(at current prices) 79.5 80.0 79.7 79.4 78.5 77.8
Household savings ratio 2.2 0.6 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
Household  debt ratio 1) 117.8 121.5 124.5 127.0 128.2 128.6
1) Household debt at end-year in relation to disposable income.
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1.3.3 Private investment
Private investment driving the economy
Private investment is set to increase year-on-year throughout the outlook horizon. The 
growth rate will be strongest for the current year. The deteriorating outlook for the global 
economy will have only a minor impact on investment, which will primarily be driven by 
construction. Robust growth will be recorded for both investment in residential and other 
building construction. Building renovation is also at a high level. Furthermore, a signifi-
cant increase will be seen in machinery and equipment investments. R&D, on the other 
hand, will be adversely affected in the short term both by cutbacks in public funding and 
by redundancies of private sector research staff. The negative real interest rate is bolster-
ing investment, whereas low total demand growth is not yet in itself have an accelerat-
ing effect. The ratio of private investment to GDP is set to increase, but not yet reach the 
pre-crisis level. The ratio of gross investment to GDP will also increase over the forecast 
period.
There are upside risks to the 2018 investment forecast in that the forest industry, for 
instance, has major projects in the pipeline. In addition, civil engineering works for the 
Pyhäjoki nuclear power plant have now started up, and plans are in place to build a range 
of auxiliary structures in 2017 and 2018. Moreover, in relation to the 2017 bugdet negotia-
tions the Government decided on various additional measures affecting the state subsid-
iced housing production.
The most recent national accounts figures show that private investment was up 2.2% 
in 2015, although provisional data in March still indicated a one per cent fall. The private 
investment forecast for the current year projects a growth rate of over 4%, which will then 
slowly fall back over the coming years. In 2015 investment in machinery and equipment 
recorded particularly robust growth at 7%. R&D, on the other hand, remained on a sharp 
downward trend.
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Construction investment driving employment to growth
The construction investment forecast for the current year predicts robust growth of over 
8%. The increase in new housing construction has already brought a sharp rise in the 
number of hours worked in the construction sector. It is expected that growth will remain 
robust in 2017 as the cubic metre volume of planning permissions in January-May was up 
20% from the corresponding period last year.
Housing investment will be driven above all by low interest rates and the shortage of 
housing in growth centres, which is reflected in high yields from rents as well as sales prices. 
Housing production is mainly concentrated in and around the biggest cities and univer-
sity towns, and mainly consists of the building of blocks of flats. The number of new hous-
ing starts in the first part of the year is clearly higher than last year, but the trend will slow 
towards the end of the year because in 2015 the number of starts began to rise sharply after 
the summer and the reference level will therefore be higher. It is estimated that the volume 
of new housing production will increase by some 15% this year.
Housing renovation is expected to continue to grow at an annual rate of around 2% over 
the forecast horizon, which is due to the need to update the ageing housing stock. Renovation 
investment by residential housing companies in particular has continued to rise, causing their 
stock of debt to rise in the first part of the year. Monthly changes compared with the corre-
sponding periods of the previous year have been over 10%. Total housing investment, includ-
ing both new housing construction and renovation, will continue to increase in 2017 and 2018.
Construction investment growth is broad-based. In other building construction, too, the 
first half of the year has seen robust growth in almost all categories. The cubic metre volume 
of planning permissions for business and office premises has risen sharply. Investment in 
public service buildings is at its highest level in 10 years. Other building construction pro-
jects take longer to complete than housing construction, and therefore some 2017 and even 
2018 investments have already proceeded to implementation. In 2018 it is expected that the 
accelerating global economy will further increase construction investment.
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Civil engineering investment bolstered by public projects and regional construction
Civil engineering turnover and sales have grown solidly early in the year. Order books in 
the sector are strong above average, although the capacity utilisation rate in the spring was 
a disappointing 74%. Civil engineering companies take the view that demand remains the 
biggest obstacle to growth.
The price of crude oil began to fall again in the summer, and the reduced price pressures 
are certainly good news for civil engineering investment as oil represents a significant cost 
factor. The forecast for next year predicts accelerating growth, among other reasons because 
of the repair debt programme launched by the Government. Civil engineering investment 
is expected to slow and show hardly any growth in 2018.
A large number of civil engineering projects are in the planning stages or have recently 
started up. Several new projects will be launched in 2017. Major regional construction pro-
jects are also underway or gearing up. In the energy sector, new civil engineering invest-
ments are being lined up in connection with the electricity transmission network, liquefied 
natural gas terminals and wind power, for instance. 
Broad-based growth in machinery and equipment investments
It is projected that investment in machinery, equipment, transport equipment and weap-
ons systems will accelerate to brisk growth in the next years ahead. Although deep in the 
red in Q1, machinery and equipment investments will recover to record annual growth 
on the back of investments in the forest industry. The single most significant factor is the 
new bioproduct mill under construction in Äänekoski, where machinery and equipment 
acquisitions are estimated to come in at EUR 750 million, accounting for almost 10% of 
the total annual investment. Acquisitions of mobile work machinery and trucks have also 
developed well, whereas demand for semi-trailers and buses and coaches has been weaker 
than last year.
The most recent Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) survey in June 2016 showed 
that investment for the current year was on a growth track of over 10%. According to the 
survey fixed industry investment in Finland returned to clear growth last year. This is 
reflected above all in a strong 7% growth rate for machinery and equipment investments 
in 2015. The survey results show that capacity utilisation rates have risen by a couple of per-
centage points compared with June last year. The rates are particularly high in the machin-
ery industry and other traditional metal industry sectors.
The outlook predicts that the strong quarterly growth of investment in machinery, equip-
ment, transport equipment and weapons systems will come to a halt in 2017. It is predicted 
that growth will return to a well above average level in 2018, with the rebounding global 
economy bolstering Finnish export demand. 
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R&D investment not to return to growth until 2017
R&D investment will continue to fall in 2016 with the continuing redundancies of private 
sector research staff and cutbacks in central government R&D funding. According to the 
EK investment survey the chemical industry looks set to increase its investment this year, 
whereas investment in the technology industry will fall by more than 5%. However the 
forecast is that R&D investment will return to growth in 2017 and gather further momen-
tum in 2018 on the back of the improving global economy.
Statistics Finland reports that 55% of companies surveyed in 2012–2014 were engaged in 
innovation activity. Involvement in innovation was more common in industrial companies 
than in service companies. In industry, R&D investment was more common in the electri-
cal and electronics industry and the chemical and textile industries. In services, Statistics 
Finland found that innovation was most common in software production, insurance and 
financial intermediation, information service activities, telecommunications and in R&D. 
The majority of innovating companies invested in R&D projects generating environmental 
benefits. The biggest motives for investment were high energy, water and materials costs, 
environmental regulations and corporate reputation benefits.
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Table 8. Fixed investment by type of capital asset
2015
share, 
%
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
Change in volume,%
Buildings 44.9 -5.0 -5.2 -0.4 8.3 4.1 3.2 
Residential buildings 26.7 -5.3 -6.9 0.0 9.0 4.0 2.5 
Non-residential buildings 18.2 -4.6 -2.7 -1.1 7.3 4.3 4.3 
Civil engineering construction 10.3 2.2 4.1 2.4 2.9 2.6 1.1 
Machinery and equipment 23.4 -8.7 -1.8 7.0 1.9 2.4 2.8 
R&D-investments* 21.4 -3.7 -0.4 -4.0 -1.0 2.7 3.3 
Total 100.0 -4.9 -2.5 0.7 4.3 3.3 2.9 
Private 80.9 -6.6 -3.4 2.2 4.3 3.9 3.8 
Public 19.1 2.6 0.9 -5.1 4.3 0.6 -0.8 
%
Investment to GDP ratio (at current prices)
Fixed investment 21.2 20.6 20.4 21.2 22.0 22.6 
Private 17.0 16.4 16.5 17.2 17.9 18.6 
Public 4.2 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 
* Includes cultivated assets and intellectual property products
1.3.4 Public investment
Public investment fell by 5% last year. This was due to sales of real estates by author-
ised pension providers, which are recorded as negative investments, and to a substan-
tial decrease in central government investment. In 2016 public investment will rebound 
to its earlier level. After the current year the total volume of public investment is hardly 
expected to increase. The public investment to GDP ratio is around 4%.
The Government’s commitment to spend around EUR 600 million in transport infra-
structure maintenance in 2016–2018 will contribute to maintain central government invest-
ment. Overall investment will not increase, however, because there are very few new infra-
structure projects and because R&D funding is decreasing. Investment in weapons systems 
may increase somewhat.
Local government investment expenditure has long been rising very sharply. In 2015, 
however, investment stopped growing, and it is projected that the growth rate over the next 
few years will be clearly more moderate. Despite fiscal adjustment, investment will continue 
to remain at a high level in the local government sector. Maintenance and repairs of the local 
government building stock require substantial investment. In growth centres new building 
construction and infrastructure investment will continue at a high level over the years ahead.
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1.4 Domestic production
1.4.1 Total output
Economic growth driven by production serving domestic demand
The Finnish economy moved out of recession in late 2015. However growth has been sub-
dued. Provisional data indicate that in April-June, output for the total economy increased 
by 1.3% on the year before, with the thrust of this growth coming from secondary pro-
duction and services. In secondary production sectors construction output has shown 
particularly strong growth, reaching almost 6% in Q1. Growth in construction has been 
broad-based in that both housing development and production-related construction have 
increased. Service production growth was driven by business services. Industrial produc-
tion, by contrast, has continued to fall, with all main sectors recording a disappointing 
performance. In the first half of 2016 gross value added for the economy increased by over 
half a per cent from the year before. 
Over the summer it became increasingly clear that the main driver of growth is production 
serving demand in the domestic market. The outlook in construction and sales expectations in 
service branches have improved at the same time as the value of new orders in industry is con-
tinuing to fall. According to business tendency surveys shortage of demand is clearly a smaller 
obstacle to growth than earlier. Among the main sectors of the economy it is surprisingly ser-
vice branches that most often feel hampered by lack of demand: one in three service companies 
cite lack of demand as an obstacle to growth. In the construction sector, one in three companies 
responding to the survey are hampered by the shortage of skilled labour. There are no prospects 
of a quick rebound in industry, where order books remain lower than normal and stockpiles of 
finished goods have furthermore remained at close to normal levels. In addition to the above 
mentioned cyclical barriers to growth, the Finnish economy is hampered by restructuring that 
is causing capacity problems, especially in the paper and electronics industries.
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In the first half of 2016 quarter-on-quarter total value added growth was zero in Q1 but picked 
up to 0.3% in Q2. Growth will continue to accelerate in the second half of the year on the back 
of improving performance in construction and business services. In 2016 growth will be driven 
above all by construction and service production geared to meeting domestic demand. GDP will 
increase by one per cent in 2016. In 2017 and 2018, industrial output will bolster GDP growth, 
which will come in at over 1%. Output will be 4% lower than the peak performance figures of 
2008. The Competitiveness Pact is a step in the right direction to improving cost competitive-
ness, but it will take some time for its effects to be fully felt because in the current economic 
situation, output growth is being hampered by lack of demand.
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1.4.2 Secondary production
Industry orders slow to come in
Industrial output is set to decline for the sixth year in succession. This is due both to the weak-
ness of the global economy and the production structure in industry. The bulk of production 
consists of raw materials and investment goods that are exported, and demand for neither is 
currently increasing very rapidly. Furthermore global competition is intense in several prod-
ucts.
The outlook for industrial production in 2016 is subdued. Export demand is weaker than 
normal, many companies are facing competitiveness issues, and competition for market 
shares is intense. Indeed, the outlook for industry has not improved at all from earlier in 
the year. Industrial companies are expecting to see a fall in their output late in the sum-
mer and a modest improvement towards the end of the year. Production expectations are 
strongest in the chemical industry, but even there an improvement is not expected until late 
in the year. The metal industry has the most negative outlook and does not expect to see an 
increase in its output in 2016. Overall industrial production will decline by 2% this year.
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In 2017 export demand is set to record its strongest growth since 2011 as imports in 
emerging economies rebound from the dip this year. Due to competitiveness issues and 
structural changes in demand, production in export companies will still not reach the same 
rate of growth as global trade, and therefore the rebound of industrial production will be 
subdued and come in small steps. Furthermore, the sectors that used to be the main drivers 
of the economy have scaled down their production capacities in Finland. Therefore indus-
trial production will increase by some 2% in 2017 and by 3% in 2018. The outlook for pro-
duction is strongest in the pulp industry, where production capacity is increasing, and in 
the chemical industry. Despite the growth, the volume of industrial output in 2018 will be 
one-quarter lower than in the peak year of 2007.
Construction going strong 
Construction output returned to growth last year and has accelerated considerably dur-
ing the current year. This growth is being driven not only by new construction of residen-
tial and other buildings, but also by renovation especially in residential and office build-
ings. Furthermore, government investment in infrastructure is boosting civil engineering 
works. The number of construction companies reporting scarcity of demand as a barrier 
to growth is down to one in four, at the same time as access to skilled labour is increas-
ingly reported as a problem, by around one-third of construction companies. However, 
levels of new building construction are higher in growth centres than outside them, which 
means that growth is unevenly distributed.
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The outlook for construction output is clearly positive, even though output growth is 
not expected to accelerate further in the second half of the year. The number of planning 
permissions granted has shown double-digit growth, and the construction of residential 
and business premises in particular is projected to increase. The strong cyclical upswing 
will drive construction output to growth of 6½% this year.
Construction will remain strong in 2017 and 2018, although the number of new starts 
will no longer increase at the same rate as this year. Therefore output growth will slow some-
what. In 2017 construction output will grow at a rate of 3% and in 2018 at a rate of 2%. As a 
result 2018 value added in the construction sector will exceed the 2007 figure by one per cent.
1.4.3 Services
Private services set to grow
Private service production is increasing at the same time as public service production is 
being curtailed. The share of services in Finnish GDP continued to increase last year and 
now stands at over 70%, close to the euro area average of 74%. Service production increased 
by 0.8% last year. Output increased especially in information and business services, but 
declined in transport and public services. Service production in January–June was up 1.2%. 
The outlook for services has improved appreciably. The number of service companies 
expecting to see improved sales in the latter half of the year is clearly higher than last year. 
However lack of demand is the biggest barrier to growth in services, and profitability is 
expected to improve only marginally. The development of service production is dependent 
on secondary production and consumption demand. Most services are used in the busi-
ness sector, and therefore it is necessary for business to rebound before service production 
can expect to see stronger growth.
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The outlook for sales growth is strongest in information and communications services for 
business as well as in financial intermediation and insurance services. The hotel and restau-
rant sector is also expecting to see growth. The outlook for trade remains subdued because 
wholesale is declining and because consumer purchasing power is developing weakly.
Service production growth will remain subdued because of the weakness of industrial 
production: overall service production will increase by less than one per cent this year. 
In 2017 the rebound of business activity will provide a slight boost to service production, 
which will continue on a steady 1% growth path in 2018. Just as construction, service out-
put will exceed its pre-crisis level.
Table 9. Production by industry
2015
share,  
%1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** Average
2015/ 
2005
 change in volume, %
Industry 20.6 0.0 -0.5 -2.5 -2.2 1.9 2.6 -1.2
Construction 6.3 -2.0 -3.7 1.0 6.6 3.2 2.4 -0.4
Agriculture and forestry 2.5 8.3 -2.5 0.6 3.0 1.1 2.1 2.3
Industry and construction 26.8 -0.5 -1.3 -1.7 -0.5 2.2 2.5 -1.0
Services 70.6 -1.4 -0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7
Total production at basic prices 100.0 -0.9 -0.8 0.1 1.0 1.2 1.4 0.3
GDP at market prices -0.8 -0.7 0.2 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.4
Labour productivity in the whole economy 0,5 -0,1 0,2 0,0 -0,3 1,0 0,2
1) Share of total value added at current prices.
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Competitiveness between companies in the light of survey results 
Competitiveness between companies can be measured in various different ways. From the 
macro perspective, one of the most common methods of measurement is to examine the devel-
opment of unit labour costs. Unit labour costs usually describe average relative cost trends 
for the sector concerned. According to the most recent MoF forecast, the nominal unit labour 
costs for the Finnish economy will fall by 0.7% from 2015 to 2017, at the same time as the EU 
Commission’s Spring Forecast predicts an increase of 3.1% for Sweden, 4.2% for Germany, and 
2.0% for the euro area on average.
Changes in sectoral unit labour costs shed no light on other factors impacting competitive-
ness. These include the desirability or quality of products, marketing, branding, availability, etc. 
Organisational competitiveness also impacts on companies’ export success via productivity. In 
addition to the internal production process, this competitiveness is impacted by solidity and 
legislation, for example.
The following examines industrial companies’ current perceived competitiveness as com-
pared with their perceived long-term competitiveness on average. The comparisons are based 
on the results of the EU Commission’s quarterly business tendency surveys. One outcome meas-
ure of the survey is the industrial company’s perceived relative competitive position by main 
industrial groupings (MIG). Industrial companies participating in the survey are asked to assess 
their perceived competitive position separately in the domestic market, in the EU internal mar-
ket and in non-EU markets. The focus here is restricted to perceived industry competitiveness 
outside the domestic market. In Finland, responses are obtained from some 700 industrial 
companies. The corresponding questions are not presented to companies in other branches.
According to the latest results in July, Finnish industrial companies producing foods and 
intermediate goods for the EU internal market rated their competitiveness as average in com-
parison with other firms operating in the internal market (see Figure 1). Companies producing 
consumer goods and especially investment goods, on the other hand, thought their competi-
tiveness in the internal market was clearly weaker than average.
In non-EU markets, by contrast, intermediate goods producers thought their competitive-
ness was stronger than average (Figure 2). Producers of investment goods rated their competi-
tiveness in non-EU markets as weak, just as they did in the internal market. This is a crucial result 
for Finnish commodity exports in that raw materials and investment goods constitute the bulk 
of our export companies’ output: in 2015 they accounted for 88.1% of the total value of Finnish 
goods exports. Consumer goods account for just over 10%.
When examined by sector, companies in the chemical and building material industries 
rated their competitiveness as stronger than average in the EU internal market. Companies in 
the textile, forest and basic metal industries, on the other hand, rated their competitiveness 
as weaker than average. In non-EU markets, companies in the forest, chemical and furniture 
industries as well as certain companies in the base metal industry thought their competitive-
ness was stronger than average. Companies in the textile, printing and motor vehicle industries 
rated their competitive position as weaker than average.
Different competitiveness indicators paint slightly different pictures of the competitive-
ness of Finnish industrial companies. In 2015–2017 unit labour costs in Finland will increase at 
a somewhat slower rate than in the euro area on average. The Competitiveness Pact signed in 
June 2016 will contribute to strengthen Finnish competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the euro 
area. Based on the results of business tendency surveys, however, Finnish industrial companies 
feel their competitiveness is poor, especially in the case of investment goods, both in the EU 
internal market and in non-EU markets.
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1.5 Labour force
Job vacancies and number of hours worked on the increase
The employment outlook has improved in the first part of the year, with the exception of 
long-term unemployment which is continuing to grow. As the Finnish economy emerges 
from a sustained period of recession and economic activity continues to rebound espe-
cially in the construction sector, the number of hours worked has already started to 
increase: the figure for January–June was up 3.4% from the corresponding period last year. 
The number of job vacancies in January–June is also up from the year before. Increasing 
demand for labour will turn employment to modest growth of 0.4% this year.
Unemployment growth has come to a halt in the first half of 2016, according to both 
Statistics Finland’s sample-based Labour Force Survey and employment service statistics 
compiled by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. In 2015 the unemployment rate 
climbed to 9.4%, but in June this year the trend of the unemployment rate fell back to 8.9%. 
It is predicted that unemployment will fall slowly over the rest of the year as some of the 
disguised unemployed will probably return to actively searching for work with the increas-
ing number of job vacancies. The projected unemployment rate for the current year is 9.0%.
Moderate GDP growth in 2017 and 2018 will be strong enough to keep employment on an 
upward trend and at the same time to slowly reduce the number of unemployed people. In the 
absence of more robust economic growth, however, unemployment will remain high throughout 
the outlook period. Employment is predicted to improve by 0.3% in 2017 and by 0.5% in 2018. 
The unemployment rate is expected to fall back to 8.8% in 2017 and further to 8.5% in 2018.
Long-term and structural unemployment have continued to grow. In June the number 
of people who had been out of work for more than a year was 127,000, some 17,000 more 
than one year earlier. According to the Ministry’s employment service statistics the num-
ber of structurally unemployed people in June was 217,000, or 4,000 more than the corre-
sponding figure last year. In recent years long-term unemployment has increased in all age 
groups, but most of all among those aged 25–54. Despite the improving economy, the high 
level of structural unemployment will slow the decline in the unemployment rate.
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Despite the improved employment outlook, broad unemployment or the total number of unem-
ployed job seekers and those under activation programmes has remained extremely high at over 
450,000. Apart from the weakness of the economy in general, another obstacle to an improve-
ment in the employment situation is presented by regional and occupational mismatch problems 
between unemployed job seekers and job vacancies. Ministry data for April–June indicate that the 
number of job vacancies has continued to increase, but this has had little effect on the number of 
unemployed persons in employment service statistics. In the construction sector there are 20,000 
people out of work at the same time as some areas are suffering from shortages of skilled labour.
Steps to lengthen working hours under the Competitiveness Pact will increase the number 
of hours worked from 2017 onwards, which in the short term may reduce recruitment needs 
in the private sector and in general government. In the longer term it is thought that longer 
working hours will have no negative impact on employment, assuming that labour produc-
tivity per employed person will improve. Employment growth is in turn supported by the 
agreement of 0% collective wage increases under the Competitiveness Pact as well as reduc-
tions to the employer’s social security contributions, which will have the effect of reducing the 
cost of labour from 2017 onwards. Overall it is estimated that the measures under the Com-
petitiveness Pact will have only a minor impact on employment during the outlook period, 
as it will take some time for the reduced labour costs to filter through and bolster exports. 
For the most part the positive effects on employment will not be seen until 2018 and beyond.
Figures for unemployed job seekers registered with employment offices and Statistics 
Finland’s sample-based Labour Force Survey give a slightly different picture of the level 
and development of unemployment.
At the moment the discrepancy between the unemployment figures reported by Statistics 
Finland and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy is further accentuated by the 
fact that some unemployed people have given up their active search for work because of the 
weak economic situation. The Statistics Finland concept of unemployment is based on the 
criterion of active search for work during the past four weeks, and the inactive unemployed 
are classified in the Labour Force Survey as ’disguised unemployed’. The differences between 
the two sets of figures are also explained by changes in statistical methods and legislation
Table 10. Labour market
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
annual average, 1,000 persons
Population of working age (15-74  yrs) 4 087 4 096 4 102 4 110 4 119 4 131
change 12 9 6 8 9 12
Population of working age (15-64 yrs) 3 508 3 491 3 476 3 465 3 453 3 443
change -16 -17 -15 -11 -11 -10
Employed (15-74 yrs) 2 457 2 447 2 437 2 446 2 454 2 466
of which 15-64 yrs 2 403 2 386 2 368 2 373 2 377 2 385
Unemployed (15-74 yrs) 219 232 252 241 236 228
%
Employment rate (15-64 yrs) 68.5 68.3 68.1 68.5 68.8 69.3
Unemployment rate (15-74 yrs) 8.2 8.7 9.4 9.0 8.8 8.5
1,000 persons per annum
Immigration, net 17 18 12 15 17 17
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1.6 Incomes, costs and prices
1.6.1 National income
National income refers to domestic primary income, i.e. employee compensations, taxes 
on production and imports net of subsidies, operating surplus and property income. In 
2015 nominal net national income growth increased by 2.0%, compared with 1.7% in 
2014. The national income items showing the strongest growth are property income and 
entrepreneurial income, which were up by 5.7% and 6.1%, respectively, in 2014. 
Among the other components of national income, 2015 employee compensations 
increased by around 1% from the previous year. The wage bill increased by 1.0% and social 
security contributions paid for the benefit of employees increased by 1.4%. Taxes on pro-
duction and imports net of subsidies, was virtually unchanged from the year before. 
Employee compensations as a proportion of national income amounted to around 60% 
in 2015. Accordingly, net property and entrepreneurial income as a proportion of national 
income stood at 24%. The proportion of employee compensations has increased clearly 
from the figure of around 56–57% in the early 2000s. However the current figure is still a 
long way away from those recorded in the recession in the early 1990s. The peak figure was 
recorded in 1991 at 74% of national income.
It is expected that property and entrepreneurial income will continue to increase over 
the outlook horizon, which will contribute to drive national income. Taxes on production 
and imports net of subsidies will also continue to increase with the higher rates of indi-
rect taxation.
During the current year it is predicted that wage bill growth will accelerate from the pre-
vious year. In 2017, however, employers’ reduced social security contributions and moderate 
wage development will translate into a reduced wage bill. It is predicted that employee com-
pensations as a proportion of national income will fall towards the end of the outlook period 
with the continued sharp increase in the shares of property and entrepreneurial income.
Table 11. Disposable income
2015
share,  
%
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** On average
2015/2005
change, %
Compensation of employees 60.0 0.9 0.3 1.0 1.9 -0.6 1.2 2.8
Wages and salaries 48.6 0.9 0.4 1.0 1.7 0.8 1.7 2.9
Employers' contributions to  
social security schemes 11.3 1.0 -0.2 1.4 2.7 -6.5 -1.0 2.3
Property and entrepreneurial  
income, net 24.3 0.8 6.1 5.7 4.2 7.7 5.0 0.8
Taxes on production and imports 
minus subsidies 15.7 4.8 1.0 0.1 3.0 1.2 1.2 3.1
National income 100.0 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.6 1.7 2.2 2.3
Disposable income 1.0 1.8 2.1 2.7 1.8 2.2 2.3
Gross national income, EUR bn 204.0 207.2 210.9 216.0 220.6 226.4
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Table 12. Index of wage and salary earnings and labour costs per unit of output
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** On average 
2015/2005
change, %
Index of negotiated wage rates 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.5 2.1
Wage drift,  etc. 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
Index of wage and  salary  earnings 2.1 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.8 1.2 2.9
Real earnings1) 0.6 0.4 1.5 0.8 -0.3 -0.1 1.3
Average earnings2) 1.6 1.2 1.3 0.7 -0.7 1.3 2.1
Labour costs per unit of output 3)
whole economy 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 -1.8 -0.2 2.6
1)  The index of wage and salary earnings divided by the consumer price index.
2)  Computed by dividing the national wage bill by the number of hours worked by wage and salary earners.  
  The figures are affected by structural changes in the economy.
3)  Compensation of employees divided by gross value added in volume at basic prices.
1.6.2 Wages and salaries
Nominal earnings, as measured by the index of wage and salary earnings, increased by 
1.3% last year. The standard wage rate was up 0.6%, and other factors pushed up the wage 
index by 0.7%.
In 2016 earnings will develop in line with the new wage settlement negotiated by the 
social partners in June 2015. The Pact for Employment and Growth will push up the stand-
ard wage rate on average by 0.6%. The forecast for the development of earnings is based on 
the assumption that the contribution of factors other than increases to the standard wage 
rate will drive up earnings by 0.6% a year. Therefore it is predicted that nominal earnings 
will rise by 1.2% in 2016.
It is expected that the rise in earnings will continue to slow: the projected growth rate is 
0.8% for 2017 and 1.2% for 2018. This is considerably slower that the average rate of growth 
in the 2000s, which is well in line with the current sluggish economy and subdued employ-
ment trends.
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1.6.3 Consumer prices
Measured by the national consumer price index, consumer prices rose on average by 0.1% 
in the first half of 2016 compared with the corresponding period last year. Several factors 
explain the slow rate of consumer price inflation, but fluctuating world market prices of 
oil had a major impact. Energy prices were down by an average of 5.7% in the first half of 
2016. Goods and food prices also fell. As in earlier years, consumer inflation was mainly 
driven by higher service prices, which increased by almost 2.5%. The harmonised con-
sumer price index, which in contrast to the national index does not include owner-occu-
pied housing or interests, increased by 0.1% in early 2016.
The inflation forecast for the current year is 0.4% as measured by the national consumer 
price index. In other words, it is anticipated that consumer prices will rise slowly, but more 
rapidly than in the first part of the year. Inflation will be driven above all by the price of 
crude oil, which has risen from its rock bottom level in early 2016. The forecast assumes that 
the average price of oil in 2016 will be around 44 euros a barrel, compared with the figure 
of just under 48 euros in 2015. In the last quarter of 2016 it is expected that the price of oil 
will begin to push up inflation, and that it will continue to have an upward effect through 
to the end of the forecast horizon.
The price of energy is not the only factor contributing to curb inflation. Food prices have 
continued to fall as a result of competition in the daily consumer goods sector. Weak demand 
and the long-term fall in import prices are also impacting goods prices. Furthermore, sec-
ond-round effects of low oil prices are contributing to slow the prices of other goods. It is 
projected that service prices will rise by around 2.3% this year, faster than the year before. 
Increases to social and health care client fees are one contributing factor. 
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It is estimated that tax hikes will push up inflation by 0.6–0.7 percentage points in 2016. 
Indirect tax hikes adding to inflationary pressure include increases to the annual vehicle 
tax, tobacco tax and fuel oil tax, but on the other hand the reduction of the motor car tax 
will act in the opposite direction. The decision to increase the annual ceiling for social and 
health care client fees will increase inflation by around 0.2 percentage points. Without the 
effects of these tax hikes, consumer prices would fall in 2016.
Inflationary pressures will remain lower than usual over the next years of the forecast 
horizon as there are idle resources in the economy and the output gap is still clearly nega-
tive. It is expected that the national consumer price index will increase by 1.1% in 2017, 
and by 1.3% in the last year of the forecast horizon in 2018. Oil prices will edge up over 
the outlook period and accelerate inflation. The forecast is also impacted by assumptions 
of moderate wage increases, a weakening euro and low but gradually rising interest rates.
In the first half of 2016 the euro area inflation rate in terms of the harmonised consumer 
price index came in at 0.0%, and the same trend is expected to continue for the remainder 
of the year. Falling energy prices have slowed inflation in the euro area, too, but in contrast 
to the situation in Finland other major items in the consumer price basket have acceler-
ated inflation. The latest ECB forecast is that euro area inflation will rise to 0.3% in 2016, to 
1.2% in 2017 and 1.5% in 2018. The comparative MoF growth forecasts for Finland based 
on the harmonised consumer price index are 0.4% in 2016, 1.1% in 2017 and 1.2% in 2018, 
so it is expected that prices in Finland will continue to rise somewhat more slowly than in 
the euro area on average. 
Table 13. Price indices
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** On average 
2015/2005
change, %
Export prices1) -1.1 -0.3 -0.9 -2.0 1.3 1.4 0.4
Import prices1) -1.7 -1.6 -4.0 -2.0 1.3 1.4 0.7
Consumer price index 1.5 1.0 -0.2 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.7
Harmonised index of consumer prices 2.2 1.2 -0.2 0.4 1.1 1.2 1.9
Basic price index for domestic supply 0.2 -1.3 -3.2 -1.9 1.1 1.7 2.0
Building cost index 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 1.6 1.7 2.3
1) As calculated in the National Accounts
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2 Economic policy and public f inances
2.1 General government finances
General government finances will remain in deficit through to the end of the decade. 
Successive governments have undertaken substantial fiscal adjustment efforts, but none-
theless failed to significantly reduce the deficit. Slow economic growth is not generat-
ing enough tax revenue to finance public expenditure, which is furthermore increasing 
with population ageing. For these reasons public sector debt has grown rapidly for several 
years, and the same trend is set to continue in the years ahead. In order to be able to meet 
the expenditure pressures from population ageing in the coming decades without further 
adjustment, the budgetary position of general government would need to show a surplus 
of around 2% of GDP by the beginning of the next decade.
General government in Finland consists of central government, local government, and 
social security funds. The latter are further divided between earnings-related pension funds 
and other social security funds.
Within general government, the sector showing the biggest deficit is central government. 
In 2015, the central government deficit stood at over EUR 6 billion. It is expected that the defi-
cit will shrink to less than half the current figure by the end of the decade. The deficit in local 
government is also projected to decrease over the forecast horizon. However, the growing 
demand for social and health care services as a result of population ageing will cause mounting 
expenditure pressure in the local government sector over the longer term. Nonetheless the com-
bined deficit of central and local government will remain high throughout the outlook period.
The surplus of earnings-related pension funds has decreased in recent years as pension 
expenditure has grown rapidly and low interest rates have dented investment income. It 
is projected that the financial position of earnings-related pension funds will continue to 
weaken over the forecast horizon. Other social security funds have already been in deficit 
for the past two years because of rising unemployment. During the forecast horizon the 
position of other social security funds will be boosted by the unemployment insurance con-
tribution hike and the slowly improving employment situation.
The tax rate, i.e. the ratio of taxes and tax-like payments to GDP, is set to fall in the next 
years ahead. The Competitiveness Pact will significantly reduce the tax rate because the 
employers’ sickness insurance contributions will be lowered and taxes on earned income 
will be reduced in 2017. The expenditure rate or the ratio of public expenditure to GDP 
will also fall over the forecast horizon because the Competitiveness Pact will contribute 
to reduce public sector operating expenditure. Furthermore, fiscal adjustment and cuts to 
unemployment-related expenditure will lower the expenditure rate.
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In 2014 the Finnish public deficit exceeded the EU Treaty’s 3% of GDP reference value, 
but in 2015 the deficit came in under that limit. The deficit will remain under the limit 
throughout the forecast horizon. The public debt to GDP ratio has climbed to over 60%. 
There is a risk of significant deviation from the structural balance MTO next year. EU pro-
cedures are described in more detail in the box on page xx.
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Table 14. General government finances 1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Current taxes 32.9 33.8 34.8 35.5 35.5 36.3
Taxes on production and imports 29.3 29.6 29.7 30.5 30.8 31.1
Social security contributions 25.9 26.3 26.9 28.0 27.3 28.0
Taxes and contributions, total 2) 88.8 90.1 92.1 94.5 94.1 95.9
Other revenue 3) 23.5 23.2 23.4 23.3 23.8 24.9
of which interest receipts 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.2
Total revenue 111.6 112.8 114.9 117.3 117.4 120.4
Consumption expenditure 50.3 50.7 51.0 51.6 51.1 51.8
Subsidies 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7
Social security benefits and allowances 38.4 40.3 41.6 42.6 43.7 44.6
Other current transfers 6.0 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.3
Subsidies and current transfers, total 47.2 49.0 50.3 50.8 51.7 52.7
Capital expenditure 4) 9.1 9.2 9.0 9.4 9.7 9.7
Other expenditure 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.6 10.5 10.7
of which interest expenses 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3
Total expenditure 117.0 119.3 120.7 122.4 123.1 124.8
Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) -5.3 -6.5 -5.7 -5.1 -5.6 -4.5
Central government -7.6 -7.7 -6.3 -6.0 -6.1 -5.2
Local government -1.5 -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 -1.0 -0.9
Employment pension schemes 3.7 3.4 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.5
Other social security funds 0.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3 0.1
Primary balance 5) -5.1 -6.1 -5.3 -4.4 -5.2 -4.3
1)  As calculated in the national accounts, ESA2010.
2)  Incl. capital taxes. 
3)  Incl. capital transfers and consumption of fixed capital.
4)  Gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers.
5)  Net lending before net interest expenses.
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Table 15. Main economic indicators in general government
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
% of GDP
Taxes and social security contributions 43.7 43.9 44.1 44.3 43.3 42.9
General government expenditure 1) 57.5 58.1 57.7 57.4 56.6 55.9
Net lending -2.6 -3.2 -2.8 -2.4 -2.6 -2.0
Central government -3.7 -3.7 -3.0 -2.8 -2.8 -2.3
Local government -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4
Employment pension institutions 1.8 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.7
Other social security funds 0.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Primary balance 2) -2.5 -2.9 -2.5 -2.1 -2.4 -1.9
General government debt 55.4 59.3 62.6 64.3 65.8 66.4
Central government debt 44.1 46.3 47.7 49.7 51.2 52.1
General government employment.  
1000 person 633 625 621 617 616 614
Central government 142 138 136 134 133 131.2
Local government 480 477 474 472 472 472
Social security funds 11 11 11 11 11 11
1)  EU-harmonized definition.
2)  Net lending before net interest expenses. 
Table 16. Fiscal balance and debt ratios in  some EU economies
2015 2016** 2017** 2015 2016** 2017**
Fiscal balance Debt
% of GDP
*Finland -2.8 -2.4 -2.6 62.6 64.3 65.8
Finland -3.2 -2.8 -2.5 62.7 65.0 66.2
United Kingdom -4.2 -2.9 -1.9 88.6 89.1 88.2
Sweden -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 44.0 43.1 42.3
Denmark -2.0 -2.7 -1.9 39.9 38.3 38.8
Ireland -1.8 -1.3 -0.8 98.4 93.9 91.5
Spain -4.8 -3.6 -2.6 100.7 101.2 100.1
Netherlands -2.2 -1.8 -1.5 66.8 66.2 65.1
Luxembourg 0.2 0.5 0.5 21.3 22.7 22.0
Portugal -4.2 -3.4 -3.5 129.1 128.5 127.2
Austria -1.6 -1.7 -1.7 85.9 85.1 84.0
Germany 0.5 0.1 0.0 71.6 69.2 66.8
France -3.7 -3.4 -3.2 96.2 96.8 97.1
Belgium -2.9 -2.8 -2.4 106.1 106.6 105.6
Italy -2.6 -2.5 -1.5 132.8 132.4 130.6
Greece -7.6 -3.4 -2.1 179.0 185.0 181.8
Source: EU Commission  forecast spring 2016; *Finland: Ministry of Finance, September 2016 
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2.1.1 Estimates of fiscal policy impact
In 2016 general government fiscal policy will be contractionary. Around EUR 700 mil-
lion of the Government’s fiscal adjustment measures will be targeted at central govern-
ment. Furthermore, fiscal policy will tighten as a result of local government adjustment 
measures and the increase to the unemployment insurance contribution. It is expected 
that as last year, the tax rate in 2016 will be just over 44% of GDP. The tax rate will fall in 
2017–2020 in response to changes introduced under the Competitiveness Part to taxes and 
social security contributions. Furthermore, the most important tax bases such as the wage 
bill and private consumption will increase more slowly than GDP. The expenditure rate 
began slowly to fall last year, and the same trend will continue in 2016–2020 in response 
to savings measures and reduced cyclical expenditure.
The current fiscal policy stance can also be examined against changes in the structural 
balance as assessed using the EU harmonised method. Structural balance is calculated 
by removing the cyclical effect from the public sector balance. The remainder describes 
the effect of the policy pursued and other than cyclical factors on the balance. Changes in 
the structural balance thus describe changes in the overall fiscal policy stance. When the 
structural balance strengthens, fiscal policy is contractionary. On the other hand, when 
the structural balance weakens, fiscal policy is expansionary.
An examination of the fiscal policy stance based on changes in the structural balance 
does not give the exact same picture as an examination of individual revenue and expend-
iture measures. No changes are expected in the structural balance this year, which means 
that fiscal policy can be described as neutral, in contrast to what an assessment of individ-
ual measures would seem to indicate. It is forecast that the structural balance will deterio-
rate clearly in 2017 among other things as a result of lowered taxes and employer contribu-
tions. Beyond 2017, it is thought that fiscal adjustment will improve the structural balance. 
Increasing age-related expenditure contributes to increase the structural deficit throughout 
the outlook period even in the absence of any decisions to increase expenditure. 
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Damned if you do, damned if you don’t – Finland and EU fiscal policy rules 
Finland has been having problems with EU fiscal policy rules since autumn 2013. The Commission 
has reviewed both actual, planned and projected breaches of these rules and warned Member 
States against failure to comply with the corrective and the preventive arm of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. So far, though, Finland has managed to remain outside both the excessive deficit 
procedure (EDP) and the significant deviation procedure (SDP).
In the past three years the Commission has investigated seven potential breaches of the cor-
rective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact, i.e. the 3% deficit and 60% debt ratio reference 
values set out under Article 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.1 Howe-
ver a de facto breach has only been identified on one occasion. In spring 2015 it was noticed 
that the Finnish general government deficit had unexpectedly climbed to 3.2% of GDP. At the 
same time, the unchanged policy forecast issued ahead of the parliamentary elections in spring 
2015 predicted that the deficit would not drop below the reference value in 2015–2019 and that 
the debt ratio would continue to rise. The Commission re-assessed Finland’s situation once the 
new Government Programme was completed, taking into account the proposed plans for fis-
cal adjustment. It concluded that all the criteria were now met. The Commission has arrived at 
the same assessment in its later reports.
At the time that the most recent report was prepared in spring 2016, it was observed that 
the 2015 deficit came in under the 3% limit. This made it possible to conclude that the 2014 
breach of the reference value was close, exceptional and temporary. This means that the defi-
cit criterion is satisfied.
When the deficit criterion is satisfied, only a breach of the debt criterion in the past year 
(i.e. based on actual figures) can trigger the EDP.2 The Commission always considers whether 
the debt criterion is fulfilled when assessing so-called other relevant factors, on which Finland 
has also offered its own views. Such factors relevant to overruns of the debt reference value, in 
Finland’s view, have included the following: 
- Solidarity measures
- Cyclically adjusted debt ratio
- Compliance with the preventive arm
At the time of writing the most recent report in May 2016, the 2015 debt ratio was estimated 
at 63.1% of GDP. In addition, the Finnish Stability Programme estimates that the debt ratio will 
rise to 67.4% of GDP in 2018–2019 and only fall back marginally in 2020. In its assessment the 
Commission states that the 2015 overrun is no longer explained by solidarity measures. On the 
other hand, cyclical weakness did still explain the 2015 overrun. In addition, the Commission 
took the view that Finland was broadly compliant with the preventive arm of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. On these grounds the Commission concluded that Finland currently is in comp-
liance with the debt criterion.
Despite the concerns expressed by the Commission, then, Finland complies with the preven-
tive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. The assessment of compliance with the preventive 
rules is based on two pillars: the structural deficit rule and the expenditure benchmark rule. 
The Commission has been sounding warnings since autumn 2013 about the risk of a significant 
deviation the structural deficit rule. On the other hand, Finland has so far always complied with 
the expenditure rule. Based on actual figures the Commission has arrived at the assessment that 
Finland has complied with the requirements of the preventive arm, at least broadly speaking.
1 The Commission’s article 126(3) reports can be retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi-
nance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/finland_en.htm and the June’s addendum 
from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/20_scps/2015/26_
fi_scp_addendum_en.pdf.
2 The Commission can also assess the risks of the criteria being breached based on planned or 
projected debt. Furthermore, if the deficit criteria is breached, the planned or projected breach 
of the debt criterion may also lead to the opening of the EDP based on both criteria.
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2.1.2 General government debt
General government debt increased to EUR 131 billion last year, more than twice the fig-
ure recorded at year-end 2008. At the same time, the public debt-to-GDP ratio breached 
the 60% reference value set out in the EU Treaty. Public debt continued to increase in the 
first quarter of 2016 by almost EUR 3 billion from the end of last year, according to Statis-
tics Finland data. It is estimated that the general government deficit is so high that pub-
lic debt will continue to increase in the years ahead, although the debt rate is projected to 
plateau in the medium term.
Central government on-budget debt accounts for the bulk of public debt, over EUR 
100 billion. Indeed, the public debt forecast is based on projections for central government 
debt. Local governments also have debts, amounting to a total of almost EUR 20 billion. 
Social security funds have so far had no debt at all, but in 2014 and 2015 the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Fund was forced to borrow to cover the costs of increased outlays on unem-
ployment benefits. This was a temporary move, however, and the debt of social security 
funds is already decreasing. In addition, general government debt also includes some other 
items. Debts between general government sub-sectors are consolidated out of the measure 
of public debt. The biggest single internal general government debt item are investments 
by earnings-related pension funds in government debt securities. This item has recently 
decreased considerably.
General government debt to GDP increased by 3.3 percentage points in 2015. The table 
below describes the factors contributing to the change in the general government debt ratio. 
The purpose of the table is to clarify the relationship between the general government budg-
etary position and debt ratio change in the national accounts. A plus sign indicates that the 
factor has the effect of increasing the debt ratio, a minus sign that it decreases the debt ratio.
Table 17.  Change in general government debt ratio and related factors
2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018** 2019** 2020**
Debt ratio, % of GDP 59.3 62.6 64.3 65.8 66.4 66.2 65.6
Change in debt ratio 3.8 3.3 1.7 1.5 0.6 -0.2 -0.6
Factors impacting change in debt ratio 
Primary budgetary position 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.1
Interest expenditure 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
Change in GDP volume 0.4 -0.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8
Change in GDP price -1.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.8 -1.0 -1.1 -1.3
Acquisition of financial assets (net) 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6
Other factors 1) -0.4 0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3
1) Includes privatization proceeds, lending and factors related to the valuation and timing of revenue and expenditure. 
Plus indicates increasing effect on debt ratio, minus a lowering effect on debt ratio.
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The general government primary balance (revenue minus expenditure, excluding interest 
payments) showed a deficit last year, driving debt growth by 1.6 percentage points. Interest 
payments increased the debt ratio by 1.2 percentage points. When the level of debt is com-
pared with GDP, GDP value growth has the effect of lowering the debt ratio. In 2015 the 
growth of GDP value reduced the debt ratio by over one percentage point. 
Earnings-related pension funds, which come under general government, are running a 
surplus. In 2015 that surplus was 1.3% of GDP (‘Acquisition of financial assets (net)’). Since 
the surplus of these pension funds is included in the primary budgetary position of gen-
eral government, but it is not used to pay off general government debt, this surplus must be 
excluded from the range of factors impacting the change of debt ratio.
In addition to these factors, central government lending and factors related to the valu-
ation and timing of revenue and expenditure increased the general government debt ratio 
by 0.5 percentage points in 2015.
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2.2 Central government
The national accounts central government deficit figure decreased considerably in 2015. 
This was largely by virtue of the fiscal adjustment measures adopted by the previous gov-
ernment and a one-off transfer from the State Pension Fund to the central government 
budget. Central government expenditure did not increase at all, and revenue growth was 
moderate.
In 2016 economic growth will pick up from last year. At the same time, tax revenue 
growth is set to accelerate. The fiscal adjustment measures set out in the programme of 
Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Government will slow the growth of spending. The central 
government deficit will decrease.
From the beginning of 2017 the Competitiveness Pact and the associated tax cuts will 
adversely affect the budgetary position of central government. Nonetheless the budgetary 
position will broadly remain more or less unchanged from the previous year.
Accelerating economic growth over the medium term will start to reduce the central 
government deficit at a faster rate. Some of the fiscal adjustment measures announced by the 
Government will take effect after 2017, so their effects on the deficit will only become appar-
ent in the medium term. However the deficit will still be substantial at the end of the decade.
Central government debt has climbed to over EUR 100 billion and in 2017 will rise fur-
ther to around EUR 111 billion. The amount of debt has doubled in the space of 10 years. 
As budgets will continue to show deficits through to the end of the decade, central gov-
ernment debt will continue to rise. However the rate of debt accumulation will slow in the 
medium term. By year-end 2020 central government debt will increase by EUR 24 billion. 
State guarantees include all guarantees issued by central government, state enterprises, 
state-owned joint stock companies and special credit institutions ultimately backed by cen-
tral government. These guarantees are not an expenditure item and do not show up in the 
state budget, unless the guarantees are called. The amount of government-issued guarantees 
has increased rapidly in recent years. At year-end 2015 the stock of state loan guarantees 
stood at almost EUR 45 billion, or almost 80% of state budget expenditure.
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Table 18. Central government 1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Current taxes 12.2 12.6 13.0 13.6 13.7 13.9
Taxes on production and imports 29.3 29.6 29.7 30.5 30.8 31.1
Taxes and contributions, total 2) 42.2 42.7 43.3 44.6 45.0 45.6
Other revenue 3) 8.8 8.8 9.2 8.8 8.9 9.2
of which interest receipts 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Total revenue 51.0 51.5 52.6 53.3 53.9 54.7
Consumption expenditure 13.7 13.7 13.7 14.0 13.8 13.8
Subsidies and current transfers, total 37.7 38.2 38.2 38.1 38.8 39.0
to general government 25.8 26.2 26.2 26.6 27.4 27.5
Interest expenses 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1
Capital expenditure 4) 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 5.2 5.0
Total expenditure 58.6 59.1 58.9 59.4 60.0 60.0
Net lending (+) / net net borrowing (-) -7.6 -7.7 -6.3 -6.0 -6.1 -5.2
Primary balance5) -5.6 -5.6 -4.4 -4.0 -4.3 -3.5
1)  As calculated in the national accounts.
2)  Incl. capital taxes.
3)  Incl. capital transfers (excl. capital taxes) and consumption of fixed capital.
4)  Gross fixed capital formation and capital transfers.
5)  Net lending before net interest expenses.
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2.2.1 Central government expenditure
For the first time in 15 years, central government national accounts expenditure did not 
increase at all last year. Both current transfers and consumption expenditure, the single 
biggest items, decreased. A significant number of expenditure adjustment measures intro-
duced by the previous government were scheduled precisely for 2015.
Current transfers account for over half of total central government expenditure. Amount-
ing to over EUR 31 billion, most of these transfers go to local governments and social secu-
rity funds, but they also include transfers to non-profits institutions, fees paid to the EU, 
and development aid to foreign countries. Almost one-quarter of total expenditure, close 
to EUR 14 billion, goes to consumption, i.e. labour costs and acquisitions of production 
inputs. Other major expenditure items include subsidies paid and property and invest-
ment expenditure.
It is projected that with the Government’s fiscal adjustment measures taking effect and 
with the moderate development of costs, expenditure growth will remain slow over the 
outlook period. Central government expenditure to GDP will fall.
Asylum seekers and the Government’s key projects will, among other things, contrib-
ute to increase expenditure in 2016. The amount budgeted for the costs of immigration in 
2016 is almost EUR 800 million higher than in earlier years, when the number of asylum 
seekers was considerably lower than in 2015. A total of EUR 1.6 billion is earmarked for 
the Government’s key projects in 2016–2018, including additional investments in transport 
infrastructure maintenance to reduce the repair debt. 
In 2017, increases in central government expenditure will be driven by the financing of 
key projects, the effects of the Competitiveness Pact, transfers to municipalities for tax com-
pensations, and the growth of pension expenditure. The Competitiveness Pact will increase 
central government spending because the reduction of employers’ social insurance contri-
butions will be offset by increasing central government transfers to the Social Insurance 
Institution Kela. On the other hand, the pact will also have the effect of reducing expendi-
ture as central government employer contributions will be lowered and holiday bonuses will 
be cut for a three-year period. Furthermore, it is expected that the introduction of longer 
working hours will gradually reduce staff numbers and thereby employee compensations 
paid by central government. The savings measures set out in the Government Programme 
will also contribute to reduce central government expenditure. The current estimates of the 
savings effects are somewhat higher than forecast in the spring.
Interest expenses have long been quite moderate because of low interest rates and the 
country’s strong credit rating, even though central government debt has risen appreciably 
for eight years in a row. In 2015 national accounts interest expenses were almost 4.0% of 
total expenditure, compared with the peak figure of over 16% in 1997. Interest outlays will 
remain low in the immediate future because interest rates are low, even though the debt 
burden will increase every year.
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2017 State Budget and Central Government Spending Limits
The Government Programme of Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s Government includes a spending 
limits rule for on-budget expenditure during the whole parliamentary term. The spending limits 
rule covers some four-fifths of total budgeted expenditure. The purpose of the rule is to ensure 
a responsible and long-term spending policy that contributes to economic stability. 
The 2017 budget proposal is based on the April 2016 general government fiscal plan for 
2017–2020. The central government expenditure ceiling takes account of the expenditure 
savings set out in the Government Programme and in the general government fiscal plan for 
2017–2020.
The 2017 expenditure ceiling is set at EUR 44,805 million, of which some EUR 153 million is 
set aside as an unallocated reserve after the 2017 budget proposal. A further EUR 300 million 
is reserved for supplementary budget needs. Items excluded from the spending limits rule 
include expenditure that fluctuates with economic cycles as well as automatic fiscal stabilisers, 
such as unemployment security expenditure, pay guarantee, housing allowances, and basic 
social assistance. However expenditure effects resulting from changes to the criteria for these 
items are included in the spending limits. Also excluded from the spending limits are interest 
payments on central government debt, VAT expenditure, financial investment expenditure and 
expenditure corresponding to technically transmitted payments and external funding contri-
butions. Total expenditure outside the spending limits in 2017 comes to around EUR 10.9 billion.
The 2017 budget proposal puts central government expenditure at around EUR 55.2 billion, 
up by EUR 0.8 billion from the 2016 ordinary budget. Government-agreed savings in central 
government appropriations, as detailed in Annex 6 of the Government Programme, will increase 
by a net total of around EUR 0.5 billion compared with savings in 2016. The level of expendi-
ture will be increased, among others, by an increase of over EUR 200 million in appropriations 
for the Government’s key projects from 2016 onwards as well as by changes resulting from the 
competitiveness package, which will increase net budget expenditure by over EUR 400 mil-
lion. Spending on renewable energy production subsidies, state pensions and housing allo-
wance and VAT expenditure will also increase. Immigration-related spending is at roughly the 
same level as in the 2016 ordinary budget. Interest outlays on central government debt come 
to almost EUR 1.3 billion, some EUR 0.2 billion less than in the current year.
In 2017 it is estimated that on-budget revenue (excluding borrowing) will reach around 
EUR 49.7 billion and tax revenue around EUR 41.6 billion. Tax revenue is expected to grow by 
0.6 billion from the figure budgeted for 2016 (including supplementary budgets). Several tax 
cuts reduce tax revenue and the continued subdued economic growth dampens the growth 
of tax bases. Several tax-reducing changes included in the Government Programme will be put 
in place in 2017. For example, the domestic help credit will be raised and a so-called entrepre-
neur deduction will be introduced. The increases to the motor car tax and several excise duties 
shall be continued. On the other hand the levy of excise duty on sweets will be discontinued. 
Earned income tax rates will be revised to reflect the consumer price index. In addition, taxes 
on earned income will be eased in order to support the Competitiveness Pact. 
The budget proposal for 2017 shows a deficit of EUR 5.5 billion, which will be covered by 
increased government debt. At year-end 2017 it is estimated that central government debt will 
be around EUR 111 billion.
The on-budget deficit has decreased by some EUR 0.4 billion compared with the spring 2016 
general government fiscal plan. The Competitiveness Pact will adversely affect the on-budget 
balance, both as a result of increasing appropriations and the associated tax cuts. On the other 
hand, tax revenue estimates have increased since the spring with better than predicted accrual 
data. Also the estimate for dividends and sales of shares has increased since spring.
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Factors impacting change in central government on-budget balance compared with 
spring 2016 general government fiscal plan / Spending Limits Decision, EUR billion
2017
Estimated balance, general government fiscal plan 14 April 2016 -5,8
Updated expenditure estimate -0,1
Impacts of competitiveness package on central government operating expenditure, central government transfers, 
universities and universities of applied science funding and expenditure in the administrative sector under the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health -0,2
Tax compensations for municipalities to offset effects of reduced earned income taxes and taxes on pension income 
under the competitiveness package -0,3
Change caused by immigration-related expenditure, taking into account the discharge of the EUR 150 million 
reserve included in the general government fiscal plan for 2017-2020 0,2
Change in projected interest payments on central government debt 0,1
Other change (net) 0,1
Updated revenue estimate 0,5
New tax base changes (reduced taxes on earned income and corresponding reduction of taxes on pension income and 
the postponement of the broadening of the vehicle tax) -0,3
Changes to miscellaneous revenue and revenue from interests, dividends and sales of shares 0,5
Other factors impacting revenue estimate (including tax accrual data and new cyclical forecast) 0,3
CHANGE TOTAL 0,4
Estimated balance, government 2017 budget proposal 15 September 2016 -5,5
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Table 19. Forecasts for certain revenue and demand items impacting taxable income and the tax 
base in 2014-2020, annual change
2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2020/2017**
change, % per year
Taxable earned income and capital income 0,2 2.1 2.0 1.8 2 
Wage and salary earnings  and other income 0.3 0.8 1.5 1.4 2 
Pensions and other social security benefits 5.5 3.2 2.6 2.2 2 1/2
Capital income 12.6 7.8 3.4 2.8 3 
Index of wage and salary earnings 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.0 1 
Operating surplus 6.1 0.8 1.1 3.9 4 1/2
Value of household consumption expenditure 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.6 2 
VAT base 0.1 0.4 1.5 1.8 2 1/2
Petrol consumption -2.5 -1.4 -1½ -1½ -2 
Diesel consumption -1.2 1.6 1½ 1.0  1/2
Electricity consumption 0.4 -0 3½ 5½ 1 
Duty-paid alcohol consumption 0 -3.6 -1 - 1/2 - 1/2
New passenger cars 0.8 4.5 2.2 3.7 3 1/2
Consumer price index 1.0 -0.2 0.3 1.3 1 1/2
2.2.2 Central government revenues
The greatest part of central government expenditure is funded out of tax revenue. The 
most significant tax revenue items are taxes on earned and capital income, value added 
tax and corporate income tax. The development of tax revenue depends largely on the per-
formance of the economy, but tax accrual and the structure of taxation are also affected 
by government decision-making. In recent years changes the emphasis of taxation has 
increasingly shifted from direction to indirect taxes.
Tax revenue increased moderately last year when considered against the general perfor-
mance of the economy. Tax revenue growth was driven by increases in indirect taxes and by 
strong revenue from corporate income tax. In 2016 tax revenue growth will accelerate clearly 
as the economy continues to pick up. The most significant discretionary tax measure is the 
increase to the maximum amount of earned income tax credit, which will reduce government 
revenue from earned income taxation. There will be both indirect tax hikes and tax cuts.
In 2017 tax revenue growth will slow appreciably, primarily because of the Competi-
tiveness Pact and the associated tax cuts. In the medium term tax revenue will increase on 
average by 2.3 % a year. The revenue forecasts for the outlook period take account of the 
discretionary tax measures introduced by the previous and current governments for imple-
mentation in 2016–2020.
Other major sources of central government revenue include property income and trans-
fers from the State Pension Fund. Transfers from the State Pension Fund cover 40% of central 
government’s annual pension expenditure. It is estimated that central government property 
income will decrease slightly this year, but remain relatively stable over the next couple of years.
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Table 20. Impact of change in selected tax base items on tax revenue
Tax category Tax base / Demand item Change Change in tax revenue, 
EUR million
Taxes on earned income Wage and salary earnings 1-pp 386 of which central govt. 119 
and local govt. 179 
Pension incomes 1-pp 125, of which central govt. 30 
and local govt. 83
Capital income tax Investment income 1-pp 36
Corporate tax Operating surplus 1-pp
47, of which central govt. 33 and 
local govt. 14
VAT Value of private consumption 1-pp 121
Car tax Sales of new cars thousands 6
Energy tax Electricity consumption * 1% 9
Petrol consumption 1% 13
Diesel consumption 1% 14
Duty on alcoholic beverages Alcohol consumption 1% 14
Duty on cigarettes Cigarette consumption 1% 9
*excl. manufacturing industries, datacenters and greenhouses
Direct taxes
Revenue from earned and capital income taxes will increase slowly in 2016. Tax revenue 
will be reduced above all by the increase to the maximum amount of earned income tax 
credit from the beginning of 2016. In 2017 revenue from earned and capital income tax 
will decrease as a result of the direct tax cuts and changes in fees and payments under the 
Competitiveness Pact. Wage bill growth is also set to slow next year, which will reduce tax 
revenue. Other discretionary tax measures set out in the Government Programme will 
also take effect from the beginning of 2017. Overall these measures will have the effect of 
easing taxation. 
In the medium term, revenue from earned income and capital income tax is projected 
to increase on average by 2½% a year. The earned income and capital income tax forecast 
assumes that index adjustments will be carried out in 2018–2020 to ensure that the tax bur-
den on labour does not increase as a result of higher earnings levels. 
Revenue from corporate income tax paid by businesses on their profits is shared between 
central government and local government. From the beginning of 2016, the share formerly 
allocated to parishes has been replaced by an indexed appropriation.
Revenue from corporate income tax increased sharply last year, and the same trend will 
continue this year. Central government revenue from corporate income tax will increase 
with the expiry of temporary tax increases, most notably the expiry of the temporary 
increase in the share of corporate income tax revenue paid to local governments. With 
the cuts to contributions introduced under the Competitiveness Pact, business profits will 
increase and generate greater operating surpluses, which will be reflected in revenue from 
corporate income tax.
Revenue from withholding tax on interest has fallen sharply in recent years due to low 
interest rates. It is expected that revenue from withholding tax on interest will only begin 
to edge up towards the end of the forecast horizon with rising interest rates.
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Table 21. Central government on-budget revenue: estimates for 2012-2018
2015
provisional 
financial 
accounts
2016
budget  
incl. sup-
plementary 
budget 
2017** 2018** 2019** 2020** 2020/2016**
annual 
change, 
%EUR billion
Total tax revenue estimates 39.9 40.9 41.6 42.1 43.4 44.6 2 
Income and wealth taxes 1 12.6 13.0 13.0 13.4 13.9 14.6 3 
Taxes based on turnover 17.6 17.8 18.1 18.4 19.1 19.6 2 
Excise duties 6.8 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 1 
Other taxes 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 1 1/2
Miscellaneous revenue 6.1 5.4 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 -2 
Interest income and profit  
entered as income 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.8 1.9 1.9 -3 1/2
Total revenue estimates 49.0 49.3 49.7 50.7 51.1 52.5 1
1 Incl. YLEtax from 2013 onwards (on average 500  EUR million per year).
Indirect taxes
The relatively strong growth of private consumption will be reflected in VAT revenue growth 
this year. On the other hand, VAT revenue will be reduced by slow inflation in the immedi-
ate future. In 2017 VAT revenue growth is projected to slow. Two changes will be made to 
the levying of VAT during the outlook period, which will result in one-off postponements 
of tax remittance dates to the following year. Firstly, starting from 2017, small businesses 
will have the option to pay their VAT returns on a cash basis. Secondly, the administration 
of VAT on imports will be taken over from Customs by Finnish Tax Administration in 2018.
There have been a number of changes to energy taxation in recent years. Taxes on heating 
fuels were raised from the beginning of this year, while the peat tax was lowered from the begin-
ning of March. The tax on transport fuels will be increased from the beginning of next year.
Various changes will be made to the motor car tax and the annual vehicle tax in the next 
few years. The motor car tax will be progressively reduced from the beginning of the cur-
rent year through to 2019. The annual vehicle tax will be raised from the beginning of 2017. 
Revenue from other excise duties is usually very steady in the absence of tax base changes. 
The tobacco tax will be raised incrementally from the beginning of 2016 through to 2019.
Table 22. Impact of discretionary tax measures on general government tax revenue
2015 2016 2017** 2018** 2019** 2020**
EUR million
Earned income taxes -184 -515 -805 -150 -194 -308
Average increase in municipal tax rate 101 36 0 0 0 0
Investment income tax 100 51 2 -9 0 0
Corporate tax -85 122 155 0 0 0
Other direct taxes -122 25 49 -34 -40 0
Value-added tax 21 0 -156 -200 0 0
Energy taxes 267 103 116 0 47 -2
Other indirect taxes 156 94 140 70 68 34
Social security contributions 375 687 -922 185 -119 392
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2.2.3 On-budget accounts and national accounts
The central government on-budget deficit was EUR 4.7 billion in 2015. The corresponding 
national accounts deficit stood at EUR 6.3 billion. This is quite a noticeable difference. In 
2010–2013 the national accounts deficit was smaller than the on-budget deficit, whereas in 
2014–2015 the national accounts deficit was larger. No direct inferences can therefore be 
drawn from the on-budget figures regarding the corresponding national accounts figures.
The national accounts concept of central government is much broader than the on-
budget concept. In addition to on-budget entities, the national accounts concept also com-
prises extra-budgetary funds (excluding the State Pension Fund), universities, property 
companies, the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE, VTT Technical Research Centre, and 
Solidium. From time to time it may be necessary to reassess earlier classifications of pub-
lic units, especially with the stricter interpretations that took effect in connection with the 
accounting reform. In 2016 Finnish Industry Investment Ltd is classified in the central gov-
ernment sector and no longer in the financial institutions sector. The public development 
finance company Finnfund, on the other hand, has not been reclassified from the financial 
institutions sector. In 2015 the total number of on-budget staff was around 75,000, com-
pared with 135,000 in the national accounts state.
One significant difference between the on-budget net financing requirement and national 
accounts net lending comes from financial investments. Financial investments such as cen-
tral government loans and share purchases are entered in the State Budget as expenditures. 
Loan repayments, revenue from share sales, etc., are accordingly entered on the revenue 
side. In the national accounts, these items are entered as financial transactions, which do 
not affect central government’s fiscal balance as measured by net borrowing.
National accounts interest outlays in 2015 were EUR 0.76 billion higher than on-budget 
interest outlays, which is mainly due to the fact that national accounts interest payments do 
not include the downward effect of interests on derivative instruments (swaps and futures), 
in contrast to the on-budget figures. By using derivatives, the Treasury has managed to 
achieve quite a significant reduction in the level of real interest payments from the state 
budget. In the national accounts, derivative contracts are recorded as financial transactions 
that have no effect on fiscal balance.
Another significant difference comes from the use of deferrable appropriations. These 
are two or three-year grants that are entered in the budget for one year only. In the national 
accounts, deferrable appropriations are entered on the basis of their use. The net effect of 
deferrable appropriations can vary widely from year to year.
EU countries report twice a year to Eurostat on the differences between their on-budget 
and national accounts figures. They do this in connection with their deficit and debt report-
ing. For the past years, Member States are required to provide satisfactory explanations for 
the difference between the budgetary position indicated by the central government accounts 
and the net lending figures indicated in the national accounts. The same goes for other sec-
tors of general government finances. Furthermore, the reports provide information on so-
called debt dynamics, i.e. on how closely general government net lending matches with the 
change in public debt. The next round of reports is due at the end of September.
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Table 23. On-budget balance and central government net lending1)
 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
On-budget surplus (+)/deficitT (-)  2) -6.6 -4.7 -6.0 -5.5 -5.1
Privatization proceeds (net proceeds from equity sales) -0.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Financial investment, net -0.7 -0.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7
Rvenue surplus in off-budget units -1.2 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Cash/accrual basis adjustment 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other adjustment items 3) 0.4 -0.5 1.4 0.7 1.2
Central government net lending (+) /-borrowing (-) -7.7 -6.3 -6.0 -6.1 -5.2
1)  In national accounts terms.
2)  Incl. government debt servicing. 
3)  Incl. debt cancellations,  profit on reinvested foreign direct investments, super dividends
2.3 Local government
The local government sector showed a deficit of 0.6% to GDP last year. The deficit was 
slightly smaller than the year before. Consumption expenditure increased only margin-
ally because of continuing fiscal adjustment. Cost levels also increased only moderately, 
which contributed to slow the growth of consumption expenditure. Investment expend-
iture decreased after strong rises for almost 10 years. The sluggish economy and cuts to 
central government transfers to local government meant that tax revenue and central gov-
ernment transfers growth were slow. 
In 2016 the local government deficit will continue to shrink slightly. Consumption expend-
iture will continue to rise moderately as in recent years. Local authorities will continue to 
seek greater efficiencies and consolidate their finances by taking steps to curb expenditure 
growth. Central government actions will also have the net effect of strengthening local gov-
ernment finances. Central government transfers to local governments will be increased as a 
result of the statutory revision of the distribution of costs between central and local govern-
ment, in which basic prices and finances are adjusted to reflect actual costs. Local government 
tax revenue growth, on the other hand, will remain muted because the temporary increase in 
the share of corporate tax revenue paid to local government expired during the current year. 
In addition, the average municipal tax rate rose only slightly at the beginning of the year.
Government Programme adjustment measures will strengthen local government finances
In the next few years the financial position of local governments will remain more or less 
unchanged at this year’s level. The 2017–2020 outlook only considers specified and agreed 
measures included in the spring 2016 general government fiscal plan or the 2017 budget pro-
posal. It does not include municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ own fiscal meas-
ures planned for 2017–2020; their impacts will be taken into account once the budgets have 
been drawn up. The municipal tax rates are held constant at 2016 level. The outlook does not 
reflect the social and health care reform nor the reform of regional administration.
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The direct adjustment measures set out in Annex 6 of the Government Programme 
will strengthen local government net lending especially in the next few years. On the other 
hand the programme aimed at achieving savings of one billion euros by reducing munici-
palities’ duties and obligations so far has only limited effect because most of the proposed 
steps are still under preparation.
Rather more accurate assessments can now be made about the impacts of the direct 
adjustment measures set out in the Government Programme. It has become apparent that 
the savings achieved through efficiency measures in specialised health care will be clearly 
greater than previously thought.
The Government Programme’s adjustment measures will slow the growth of consump-
tion expenditure, and the estimated savings will also be taken into account in central gov-
ernment transfers to local government. However, the ultimate impact of the measures pro-
posed to strengthen local government finances will also depend on how they are imple-
mented by autonomous municipalities and joint municipal authorities. Municipal authori-
ties can independently decide to continue to provide a service as before, even if they were 
no longer obliged to do so or if central government funding were removed. This presents 
an obvious expenditure risk to the outlook.
The pension reform that enters into force from the beginning of 2017 will also contrib-
ute to strengthen the local government’s financial position. The reform will incrementally 
raise the lower age limit for old-age pension for people born after 1954. Due to the reform 
the municipal employer’s pension insurance contributions will be lowered in 2017.
Local government finances will also be strengthened by municipal employers’ lowered 
pension payments level in 2019. The assumptions underlying the calculation of this pay-
ment level have been harmonised with those used in the long-term forecasts of the Finnish 
Centre for Pensions. The change will strengthen the financial position of local government 
and accordingly weaken the position of authorised pension providers.
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The central aim of the Competitiveness Pact is to increase growth in the economy and 
improve employment. Local government finances will also benefit from general economic 
growth and an improvement in the employment rate. The Competitiveness Pact will thus 
have an overall positive impact on local government finances. The Competitiveness Pact 
includes elements that in the medium term will both strengthen and weaken local govern-
ment finances: the agreement will clearly reduce local government consumption expenditure, 
but at the same time tax revenue and transfers from central government will also decrease.
Changes in the population age structure are increasing the need for care services and 
therefore adding to expenditure pressures in local government. Likewise, the growth of 
immigration is increasing the need for municipal services. Investment needs, the repair 
debt and service and infrastructure development in growth centres all remain at a high 
level as well. To prevent their finances from deteriorating, municipalities and joint munic-
ipal authorities must continue to seek new efficiencies in their service production or real-
locate resources from other areas to the provision of social and health care services. With-
out structural reforms and steps to curb rising expenditures, there will remain substantial 
upward pressure on municipal tax rates in the long run.
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Table 24. Local government 1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Taxes and social security contributions 20.7 21.2 21.9 22.0 21.8 22.4
  of which municipal tax 17.9 18.2 18.6 18.8 18.5 18.9
corporate tax 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6
real estate tax 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8
Other revenue 2) 18.4 18.5 18.4 19.0 18.4 18.6
of which interest receipts 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
of which transfers from central government 13.9 13.8 13.7 14.2 13.5 13.4
Total revenue 39.1 39.6 40.3 41.0 40.2 41.0
Consumption expenditure 33.1 33.4 33.7 34.1 33.8 34.4
of which compensation of employees 21.7 21.7 21.7 21.6 20.8 20.7
Income transfers 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.3 2.6 2.6
of which social security benefits and allowances 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.7 0.7
subsidies and oher transfers 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
interest expenses 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Capital expenditure 3) 4.5 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9
Total expenditure 40.6 41.2 41.6 42.0 41.2 41.8
Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) -1.5 -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 -1.0 -0.9
Primary balance 4) -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -1.2 -1.1 -1.0
1) As calculated in the national accounts.
2) Incl. capital transfers and consumption of fixed capital.
3) Gross capital formation and capital transfers.
4) Net lending before net interest expenses.
Local government accounting and national accounts: how they differ
The closest local government accounting equivalent to the national accounts concept of 
net lending is the cash flow from operations and investments (financial position). The two 
accounting systems define sector boundaries differently, and the same goes for the timing 
of concepts and entries. The reasons for the differences between the cash flow from oper-
ations and investments in local government accounting and net lending in the national 
accounts are examined in the table below.
The most important conceptual difference stems from sector definitions. Local govern-
ment accounting is concerned with local government finances as defined in the statistics 
on local government finances, i.e. municipalities, joint municipal authorities and munici-
pal enterprises. Excluded from local government finances under these statistics are such 
operations that are conducted by an independent legal entity, for instance in the form of 
a limited liability company. The national accounts definition of the local government sec-
tor, on the other hand, does include such municipally-owned enterprises that are treated 
as units serving their parent entity.
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Table 25. Financial position in local government accounting and local government net lending
2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Cash flow from municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ 
operations and investments -0.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.4
Other than municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ net lend-
ing effect 1) -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
Effect of municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ operations 
outside the local government sector -0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Acquisitions and sales of shares -0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
Differences in concepts of property expenditure and income -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Timing differences -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Other differences 2) -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
Local government net lending (+)/borrowing (-) -1.6 -1.3 -1.1 -1.0 -0.9
1) Corporations classified under local government but not included in statistics on municipal finances as well as Government of Åland, Association of 
  Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, Local Government Employers and Municipal Guarantee Board. 
2) E.g. differences in capital transfers and investment grants. 
Source: Statistics Finland, MoF
In the national accounts, the local government sector comprises the non-market activi-
ties of local and joint municipal authorities, which are primarily financed from tax revenue 
and by compulsory payments. Public corporations that primarily finance their operations 
from sales revenue from other sectors, such as water, waste and energy management as well 
as port activities, are therefore classified in the national accounts in the corporations sec-
tor, outside the local government sector.
Statistics on municipal finances and national accounts have different definitions for 
the concept of investment expenditure. In the national accounts, acquisitions and sales of 
shares and equities are recorded as financial transactions and not under local government 
investment expenditure. Statistics on municipal finances, on the other hand, record share 
acquisitions as investments in fixed assets.
There are also differences in the concepts of property expenditure and incomes. In the 
national accounts, changes in the value of assets and liabilities are not included in income 
or expenditure. Therefore, municipalities’ and joint municipal authorities’ other financing 
revenue and costs (with the exception of dividends and interests) are not included in the 
national accounts definition of net lending.
There are also differences in the timing of entries in local government accounting and in 
the national accounts. In local governments’ accounts, tax revenue describes the amount of 
tax collected during the calendar year. In the national accounts, tax revenue for the year in 
question is based on the tax authorities’ accounts of tax remittances from February through 
to the end of January the following year. This is intended to take into account the timing 
difference between advance tax payments and remittance to government.
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2.4 Social security funds
2.4.1 Earnings-related pension funds
The surplus of earnings-related pension funds fell to 1.3% of GDP in 2015, compared with 
the average of around 3% since 2000. Earnings-related pension expenditure has risen 
sharply in recent years with the growing number of pensioners and with the higher aver-
age level of pensions: new, starting pensions are higher than old ones in payment. The weak 
employment situation and slower rise in earnings have in turn dampened the growth of 
incomes from contributions, even though pension contribution rates have increased rap-
idly in recent years. Low interest rates have reduced pension funds’ property income. How-
ever rising asset prices and stock prices in particular have increased the total value of pen-
sion assets to over EUR 180 billion at year-end 2015.
The growing number of pensioners and the higher average level of new pensions will con-
tinue to drive earnings-related pension expenditure to average growth of around 4% over 
the forecast horizon. However, slower inflation and expected moderate rises in earnings 
mean that annual indexations of pensions will remain at around one per cent in 2016–2020.
In connection with the 2017 pension reform agreement the central labour market organi-
sations agreed on a 0.4 percentage point increase to the private sector earnings-related pen-
sion contribution in 2017. In addition, the decision was made to freeze the contribution 
to this level of 24.4% in 2017–2019. The latest long-term projections by the Finnish Centre 
for Pensions indicate that this contribution level will be sufficient to finance pensions even 
beyond 2019. In the medium term, the freezing of pension contributions at the 2017 level will 
reduce the surplus of pension funds, as the growth-slowing effects of the pension reform on 
pension expenditure will only begin to take hold in the 2020s.
Moderate wage increases mean that wage bill growth will remain slow despite increasing 
employment. This will be directly reflected in revenue from pension contributions. It is pro-
jected that pension funds’ revenue from property income will turn to moderate growth dur-
ing the outlook period as interest rates begin to pick up. In 2016–2020 the earnings-related 
pension funds’ surplus to GDP ratio will gradually fall from around one per cent to just over 
half a per cent of GDP. The transfer of part of the contribution burden from employers to 
employees under the Competitiveness Pact will have no effect on the financial position of 
earnings-related pension funds.
88
Table 26. Finances of social security funds1)
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
EUR billion
Investment income 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.5 3.9
Social security contributions 25.9 26.3 26.9 28.0 27.3 28.0
of which contibutions paid by employers  17.9 17.9 18.3 18.7 17.4 17.3
contributions paid by insured 8.0 8.4 8.7 9.2 9.9 10.7
Transfer from general government 13.2 13.9 14.3 14.1 15.6 15.6
Other revenue 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Revenue 43.3 44.2 45.2 45.8 46.9 48.1
Consumption expenditure 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.6
Social security benefits and allowances 33.0 34.7 35.9 36.9 38.5 39.4
Other outlays 3.0 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.4 3.5
Expenditure 39.6 41.5 43.3 43.8 45.4 46.5
Net lending (+)  / net borrowing (-) 3.7 2.7 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.6
Earnings-related pension schemes 3.7 3.4 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.5
Other social security funds 0.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3 0.1
Primary balance 2) 2.0 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.1
1)  As calculated in the National Accounts. 
2)  Net lending before net interest expenses.
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2.4.2 Other social security funds
Other social security funds consist mainly of the Social Insurance Institution (Kela) and the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund, which are responsible for the provision of basic security and 
for earnings-related unemployment security, respectively. Because of the growth of unem-
ployment expenditure, the financial position of other social security funds turned to a deficit 
of 0.4% of GDP last year, despite an increase in transfers from central and local government.
The deficit of other social security funds will shrink appreciably this year because the 
unemployment insurance contribution was raised by one percentage point from the begin-
ning of this year. As a result other social security funds will remain close to balance over the 
forecast horizon. In addition, the growth of unemployment expenditure will slow in 2016, 
and it is expected that with the gradual improvement in the employment situation, unem-
ployment expenditure will begin to fall from the beginning of 2017. Cuts to earnings-related 
unemployment security and job alternation leave compensation will also contribute to reduce 
unemployment spending. Cuts and savings will also be made in medical and health care 
reimbursements, sickness and parental allowances, general housing allowance and student 
financial aid. Furthermore, payments of child allowances and student financial aid will no 
longer be index-linked. The only measure that will drive up expenditure is the increase to the 
amount of guarantee pension.
Benefits and allowances tied to the national pension index were revised downwards by 0.4% 
from the start of 2016 in response to falling consumer prices. In line with the Government’s 
spending limits decision in the beginning of April, benefits tied to the national pension index 
will be cut by 0.85% in 2017 and, in keeping with an earlier decision, will not be increased in 
2018–2019. This does not, however, apply to basic income support, payment of which will be 
taken over from local governments by the Social Insurance Institution Kela from the beginning 
of 2017. All in all, the measures adopted by the Government will considerably reduce the expend-
iture of other social security funds at an annual level in 2019. The savings achieved will largely 
be reflected in a reduced level of central government transfers to other social security funds.
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The reduction to the employer’s sickness insurance contribution as agreed under the Com-
petitiveness Pact will dent the Social Insurance Institution Kela’s revenue by an average of 
over EUR 800 million in 2017–2019 and by around EUR 500 million from the beginning of 
2020, which will be compensated with additional funding from central government. By con-
trast the partial transfer of the employer’s unemployment insurance contribution to employ-
ees will have no effect on the financial position of other social security funds.
Table 27. Social security contributions rates and pension indices
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017** 2018**
Social insurance contributions 1)
Employers
Sickness insurance 2.04 2.14 2.08 2.12 1.06 1.13 
Unemployment insurance 2.32 2.20 2.33 2.85 2.40 2.00 
Earnings-related  pension insurance 17.35 17.75 18.00 18.00 17.95 17.75 
Local government pension insurance 24.00 23.79 23.65 23.21 21.95 21.75 
Employees
Sickness insurance 2.04 2.16 2.10 2.12 1.60 1.72 
Unemployment insurance 0.60 0.50 0.65 1.15 1.60 2.00 
Earnings-related pension insurance 5.45 5.85 6.00 6.00 6.45 6.65 
Pensioners
Sickness insurance 1.47 1.49 1.49 1.47 1.45 1.52 
Pension indices
Earnings-related index (over 65) 2475 2509 2519 2519 2533 2555 
National pension index 1609 1630 1637 1631 1617 1617 
1) Annual averages. The contributions of employers and the unemployment and employment pension contributions of beneficiaries as percentages of  
 wages and salaries.  The figures are weighted averages.
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2.5 Long-term sustainability of public finances
Despite the growth of public debt to GDP is predicted to come to halt by the end of the 
decade, it is anticipated that balance will not be restored in public finances in the medium 
term. The challenge of balancing public finances is further compounded by population 
ageing, which is driving up pension expenditure as well as health care and long-term care 
costs. The slowdown of productivity growth and stalling labour input growth are in turn 
curbing economic growth and therefore slowing tax revenue growth.
The old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of people aged over 65 to the working-age 
population (15–64 years), illustrates the challenges to public finances from the ageing pop-
ulation structure. Statistics Finland’s 2015 population projection is that this year, there are 
33 older people per 100 people of working age in Finland. By 2030, the ratio is expected to 
increase to 43 and by 2060 to 51 per 100 people of working age.
The long-term difference between general government revenue and spending is measured 
by the sustainability gap. The sustainability gap indicates the extent of medium-term adjust-
ment necessary in public finances in order to prevent public debt from spiralling out of control, 
in the long term, when rising age-related expenditure is taken into account. In other words, 
the sustainability gap is the difference between the deficit in public finances in the start-year 
(which is currently 2020) and the level of surplus required for sustainable public finances.
A sustainable level of surplus means that the general government balance should show a 
surplus of around 2% of GDP at the start of the next decade: this would be the level at which 
the fiscal challenges from population ageing could be readily met in the decades ahead with-
out additional adjustment measures being required. Instead of a 2% surplus, however, it is 
expected that public finances will show a deficit of over 1% in 2020. 
The MoF Economics Department’s assessment of the long-term sustainability of public 
finances is based on EU harmonised methods and calculation rules. The assessment of age-
related expenditure is based on a model developed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
for social expenditure analysis. By 2030, age-related expenditure is expected to increase from 
its current level by 1.6% of GDP. By 2060, the forecast indicates an increase of 1.8%.
The long-term background assumptions of the calculation (e.g. employment, produc-
tivity, interest rate and inflation) are based on those used in the 2015 report by the EU Eco-
nomic Policy Committee’s Ageing Working Group.1 The present assessment diverges from 
these assumptions in two respects: the forecasts for demographic trends are based instead 
on Statistics Finland’s 2015 population projection, and the 2016–2020 projections of eco-
nomic development are based on the MoF Economic Department’s economic forecast and 
medium-term outlook presented in this Economic Survey. The assumptions underlying the 
calculation expect an average GDP growth rate of 1.5% in 2020–2060.
It is estimated that the sustainability gap will be just over 3% of GDP at 2020 level. This 
is unchanged from the forecast presented in the spring. Both the spring and the present 
sustainability gap estimate take into account the effects of the pension reform that will take 
1 The 2015 Ageing Report: Underlying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies, European Economy 
8/2014.
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effect from the beginning of 2017: this will reduce the sustainability gap in public finances by 
around one percentage point. It is anticipated that the reform will both increase the employ-
ment rate and reduce pension expenditure. The calculation does not take into account the 
long-term actions set out in the Government Programme for the improvement of public 
finances, such as the reform of social and health care services.
The sustainability calculation is effectively a pressure projection in which developments 
under current legislation and practices are projected to the future with the help of the popu-
lation projection, the breakdown of spending by age groups, and assessments of long-term 
economic development. The further one reaches ahead of time, the greater the uncertainty 
of the projection, which is why the projection is highly sensitive to the assumptions used. 
Sustainability gap calculations are nonetheless useful tools in providing a consistent way of 
analysing and overcoming the future challenges that lie ahead for public finances.
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Appendix
Supplementary statistics
1.  Evolution of forecasts over time
2.  Outturn data and forecasts used in budget process for 2011-2015, average change, %
3.  National balance of supply and demand
4.  Financial balance of the Finnish economy
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Table 2. Outturn data and forecasts used in budget process for 2011-2015
Years 2011-2015 Average forecast errors
Forecast 
averages, % ch.
Outcome 
averages, % ch.
Forecast 
under-/over-esti-
mation1, pp.
Magnitude of 
forecast error2, 
pp.
GDP (volume) 1.7 0.1 1.6 1.8
GDP (value) 3.9 2.4 1.5 2.0
Private consumption (value) 3.6 3.0 0.6 1.2
Current account, % of GDP 0.1 -1.0 1.1 1.7
Inflation 2.4 1.7 0.7 1.1
Wage bill 3.0 1.9 1.1 1.3
Unemployment rate 8.2 8.4 -0.2 0.6
Central government debt, % of GDP 46.7 44.9 1.8 1.8
Central government net lending, % of GDP -3.2 -3.5 0.3 0.8
General government net lending, % of GDP -1.6 -2.3 0.7 1.1
Forecasts are compared with March/July preliminary national accounts data. 
Averages for the past five years are calculated on the basis of spring and autumn forecasts concerning the budget year.
1 Over- or understimation is indicated by average forecast error. 2 The average of absolute error values indicates the average magnitude of forecast errors, 
regardless of the direction of error.
Table 1. Evolution of forecasts over time1)
2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
es4 es1 es2 es3 es4 es1 es2 es3 es4 es1 es2 es3 es4 es1 es2 es3
GDP at market prices,  
change in volume, % 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 - 1.2 1.3 1.1 
Consumption, change in volume, % 1.0 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.1 - 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Exports, change in volume, % -1.1 0.6 0.6 -0.2 1.8 1.3 0.8 1.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 - 3.6 3.8 3.8 
Unemployment rate, % 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.1 8.8 - 8.7 8.7 8.5 
Consumer price index, change, % -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 - 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Central government net lending, 
relative to GDP, % -3.1 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -2.9 -2.9 -2.9 -2.8 -2.7 -2.6 -2.7 -2.8 - -2.2 -2.3 -2.3
General government net lending, 
relative to GDP, % -3.3 -2.7 -2.7 -2.8 -2.9 -2.5 -2.4 -2.4 -2.6 -2.1 -2.4 -2.6 - -1.8 -2.0 -2.0
Central government debt,  
relative to GDP, % 48.5 48.2 48.1 47.7 49.9 50.0 49.8 49.7 51.3 51.6 51.5 51.2 - 52.4 52.4 52.1
1)  Economic Survey / release date: 18.12.2015 (es4), 14.4.2016 (es1), 22.6.2016 (es2) and 15.9.2016 (es3)
Sources: Statistics Finland, MoF 
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Table 3. National balance of supply and demand, EUR million
Current prices
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
GDP at market prices 203 338 205 364 209 149 213 167 217 601 223 454 
Imports of goods and services 80 724 79 306 77 548 77 554 80 817 84 914 
Total supply 284 062 284 670 286 697 290 721 298 418 308 367 
Exports of goods and services 78 924 77 380 76 579 75 796 79 051 83 173 
Consumption 161 588 164 333 166 733 169 165 170 831 173 837 
private 111 277 113 622 115 711 117 578 119 651 121 926 
public 50 311 50 711 51 022 51 588 51 180 51 912 
Investment 43 083 42 247 42 718 45 294 47 842 50 403 
private 34 643 33 655 34 562 36 672 39 008 41 469 
public 8 440 8 592 8 156 8 622 8 834 8 934 
Total demand 284 062 284 764 287 531 291 555 299 252 309 201 
At reference year 2010 prices; not additive
2013 2014 2015 2016** 2017** 2018**
GDP at market prices 187 738 186 409 186 801 188 779 190 416 192 553 
Imports of goods and services 75 779 75 655 77 095 78 636 80 916 83 855 
Total supply 263 517 262 064 263 896 267 415 271 332 276 408 
Exports of goods and services 75 554 74 275 74 157 74 892 77 124 80 062 
Consumption 147 723 148 135 149 796 151 049 151 168 151 827 
private 102 348 102 978 104 474 105 761 106 479 107 140 
public 45 364 45 153 45 324 45 296 44 713 44 714 
Investment 39 718 38 714 38 983 40 644 41 982 43 214 
private 31 985 30 912 31 588 32 934 34 225 35 516 
public 7 728 7 794 7 393 7 708 7 756 7 697 
Total demand 263 383 261 865 264 385 267 901 271 719 276 655 
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Table 4. Financial balance of the Finnish economy
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
relative to GDP, %
Gross investment 22.2 22.3 21.2 20.6 20.4
households and  non-profit institutions 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.9 5.6
non-financial corporations and  
financial and insurance corporations 11.9 11.8 10.8 10.5 10.9
general government 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.9
Gross saving 1 22.1 20.7 19.7 19.7 20.0
households and  non-profit institutions 4.7 4.5 5.0 4.2 3.8
non-financial corporations and  
financial and insurance corporations 14.7 14.3 13.2 14.5 15.0
general government 2.8 1.9 1.5 1.0 1.1
Financial surplus -1.3 -1.8 -1.7 -1.2 -1.1
households and  non-profit institutions -2.1 -2.3 -1.5 -1.9 -2.0
non-financial corporations and  
financial and insurance corporations 1.8 2.6 2.3 3.7 3.5
general government -1.0 -2.1 -2.6 -3.1 -2.7
Statistical discrepancy 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.4
1  Incl. capital transfers (net)
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